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ABSTRACT 
 
In Australia, Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) have been established as a common 
method for governments to deliver major road infrastructure projects. Success of PPPs 
has varied when measured against Government, Community, Market and Industry 
interests. Some projects have failed financially while still having a positive impact on 
the community. Other projects have failed to reach delivery stage as a result of 
community objections. The holistic success of PPP toll roads is ultimately determined 
by the needs of major project participants being satisfied in an unbiased equilibrium 
manner.  
PPP toll roads delivered in Sydney, Brisbane and Melbourne have had varying degrees 
of financial success, however there are other vitally important factors to be considered. 
Tollways directly contribute to travel time savings, vehicle operating cost savings, 
reduced accidents and vehicle emissions and can make a contribution to the overall 
economic performance of a city. Therefore these pieces of infrastructure contribute to 
society as a whole and not just the investors who provide capital for the projects. 
Even with recent financial failings of PPP toll roads, Governments within Australia are 
still actively pursuing the PPP model to deliver road infrastructure. Lessons must be 
learnt from past failures to ensure the successful delivery and operation of future 
projects. Overall success will be a result of finding a balance between the needs of 
Government, Private Sector and Society.  
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Chapter 1 – Introduction  
 
1.1 Background 
 
In Australia, Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) have been established as a common 
method for governments to deliver major road infrastructure projects. The first toll 
roads to be completed under the PPP framework in Australia were the Sydney M4, 
which opened in 1992, followed by the Sydney Harbour Tunnel and Sydney M5 
(South Western Motorway) later that same year. Since this time, Sydney, Melbourne 
and Brisbane have had multiple toll roads delivered using variants of the PPP 
delivery model. These capital cities have embraced private sector participation as a 
way of fast tracking much needed road infrastructure that might reasonably not have 
been provided by public investment only (Li and Hensher 2010).  
  
The move towards Public Private Partnerships in the 1990s was a result of developed 
economies experiencing major structural changes after the international recession of 
1989/90. The liberalisation of economic management, the importance of balanced 
budgets and low public sector debt and currency volatility meant that governments 
had to look to the private sector for capital to fund the provision of public assets and 
services (Earl and Regan 2003). 
 
The growth of privately funded government infrastructure projects in Australia is 
driven by both government demand and private sector supply forces. Malone (2004) 
identified the drivers for both the government and private sectors. He proposed that 
Government was attracted to the PPP model as; they perceived that value for money 
can be achieved from private sector efficiencies in design, management and asset 
utilisation, efficient risk allocation; government had limited resources; there was an 
ongoing need for infrastructure to cater for changing demographics, and the 
requirement to replace infrastructure; fiscal charters enforcing debt minimisation 
targets and finally recognition that large public sector infrastructure projects have 
historically been delivered with large time and cost overruns. 
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Private sector drivers were identified as; the opportunities that the large potential 
markets hold for those engaged in financial markets, the construction industry and 
ancillary services; that PPP projects provide more certainty for those engaged in 
construction and ancillary service industries where the long term nature of the 
projects and the associated income streams provide the opportunity for the engaged 
parties to reduce their exposure to the market cycles and, lastly, the financial sector 
interests for finding markets for large pools of capital from superannuation funds and 
their need to secure predictable long term investment opportunities.  
 
A number of PPP toll roads have been delivered in Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane 
since the opening of the first PPP toll roads in the early 1990s. Sydney has had the 
M2 (Hills Motorway) 1997, the Eastern Distributor 1999, the M5 (Eastern 
Motorway) 2001, the M7 (Westlink) 2005, the Cross City Tunnel 2005 and the Lane 
Cover Tunnel 2007. In Melbourne, City Link opened in 2000, Eastlink in 2008 
followed by Peninsula Link in 2013 (although this is not a tolled road). Brisbane’s 
first PPP toll road was the CLEM7 tunnel which opened in 2010, followed by the 
Go-Between Bridge in same year, Airport Link in 2013 and Northern Link in 2015.  
 
Of these tolls roads, the Cross City Tunnel, CLEM7 and Airport Link became 
insolvent within one year of opening, while the Lane Cover Tunnel became insolvent 
within three years. Although these projects can be perceived as vital pieces of 
infrastructure, they were financially unsuccessful for their investors. It is largely 
acknowledged in literature that the failure of these projects is directly related to the 
poor performance of traffic forecasts which were used as the basis to determine the 
viability of the projects. Black (2014) stated that this is an unresolved issue of 
proposed toll roads and tunnels in Australia and identified that most toll roads have 
been built around the financial model rather than the traffic model as they should be.  
 
Melbourne’s CityLink, Sydney’s M2, M4, M5 and M7 have all been financially 
successful because the traffic projections have been close enough to accurate (Back 
2014).  As reported by Hodge (2005), early projections for investor returns for the 
M2 were 24% on their original investment. This was followed by Macquarie Bank 
reporting that one stapled security purchased for $A1.04 in 1999 was valued at 
$A6.61 in 2003.  
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Financial achievement is an important component of any PPP project however other 
factors are as vitally important. Tollways directly contribute to travel time savings, 
vehicle operating cost savings, reduced accidents & vehicle emissions and make a 
contribution to the overall economic performance of a city (Ernst & Young, 2008). It 
is therefore evident that these pieces of infrastructure contribute to society as a whole 
and not just the investors who provide capital for the project.  
 
Although some recent PPP toll roads may have failed, Governments within Australia 
are still actively pursuing the PPP model to deliver road infrastructure. This is 
evident by the recent award of the Northconnex project and Westconnex projects in 
Sydney.  
 
A direct response to project failure due to incorrect traffic forecasting is the 
development of the Government Builds, Tolls then Sells (GBTS) model. Under this 
model the government engages the private sector to design, construct and initially 
operate the facility followed by selling off the right to collect tolls and operate once 
the actual traffic volumes are known.  Under this model the government bears risk 
during the initial operational stage while the private sector bears the traffic risk after 
ramp up.  
 
In order for the successful delivery of future projects, lessons must be learnt from 
past failures. Successful outcomes of future projects require balance between the 
needs of Government, Private Sector and Society which this paper will explore 
further.   
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1.2 Project Aim and Objectives  
 
1.2.1 Aim  
 
This research project aims to identify the contributing factors to the success of toll 
road projects in Australia under the Public Private Partnerships (PPP) model.  
 
1.2.2 Specific Objectives  
 
In order to achieve the aim above the following objectives have been determined:   
 
1. Identify historically how toll roads have been developed in Australia using 
Public Private Partnerships.  
2. Investigate and establish a framework for the evaluation of success. 
3. Validate the proposed framework  
4. Assess the performance of representative case studies.  
5. Provide recommendations for the future successful delivery of projects based 
on the findings from the case studies. 
 
1.3 Methodology   
 
The methodology to undertake this project consists of reviewing a representative 
sample of case study projects to identify those factors which contributed to their 
success or detriment.  The factors which will be used to measure the case study’s 
performance will be based upon those identified from the literature review and the 
framework will be tailored to encompass additional factors, particular to toll roads in 
Australia, which also have a contributing effect. 
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Figure 1 – Research methodology flow diagram  
 
1.3.1 Framework for Evaluating Success 
 
Based upon the literature review in Chapter 2, previous studies have identified a 
multitude of factors which contribute to the success of PPP projects. Of these factors 
identified, the following will form the basis of the framework for this study; 
 
1. Risk allocation and sharing. 
2. Strength of private consortium. 
3. Political Support. 
4. Public/Community Support.  
5. Transparency of Procurement.  
6. Economic Viability. 
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The selection of these factors recognises that the needs of major project participants 
must be represented in an unbiased equilibrium manner for ultimate project success.  
The factors may potentially exist in varying degrees to achieve a successful balance. 
 
This research project will also examine additional factors identified while examining 
the case studies. These factors were not specifically covered in the literature review 
research but may contribute to a project’s perceived success or failure, these are:  
 
7. Environmental outcomes.  
8. Economic contribution to the cities/regions in which they are constructed.  
9. Additional factors that become apparent during research  
 
Ultimately upon completion of the case study review, a comprehensive framework 
comprising factors, particularly applicable to PPP toll road projects in Australia, will 
be established.  These will be based upon those identified in previous literature 
reviews but measured against the Australian experience and further expanded or 
modified as required. 
 
1.3.2 Framework Validation 
 
The framework developed through the abovementioned methodology will be 
validated by cross referencing the case studies selected and finding common factors 
contributing to success (or failure).  For example, a case study project may have 
experienced strong public and community support which appears to have contributed 
to its success.  Another project, however may also have had strong public and 
community support but this did not contribute to or was insufficient to affect this 
project’s success.  The competing effects of these factors will need to be gauged and 
weighed against each other to ascertain their contribution to the project delivery and 
operation. 
 
The most effective way to undertake this validation will be to compare and contrast 
the findings from the case study reviews at their completion.  Parallels can then be 
drawn to evaluate where commonalities exist i.e. common success factors and this 
will ultimately determine the framework which will be the outcome of this project. 
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1.3.3 Proposed Case Studies  
 
For a comprehensive validation of the framework, case studies need to be selected 
which are diverse and represent a cross section of those PPPs delivered in Australia 
in recent years.  The following projects have been selected: 
 
1. Eastern Distributor (Sydney)  
2. Cross City Tunnel (Sydney) 
3. Westlink M7 (Sydney) 
4. Go Between Bridge (Brisbane) 
 
All four projects have well documented literature available to adequately investigate 
their delivery. The Cross City Tunnel has been extensively reported by the media as 
having problems in a number of arenas.  In addition, the Westlink M7 and Eastern 
Distributor have generally been perceived as being successful while the Go-Between 
Bridge PPP delivery model is a direct response to the issues suffered by failed toll 
roads.   
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Chapter 2 - Literature Review  
 
2.1 Identification of Success Factors  
 
There is a substantial amount of literature pertaining to the evaluation of the PPP 
contractual model and discussion on its effectiveness.  In this literature review, 
relevant papers have been selected from the last 16 years to provide an understanding 
of factors that have been found to contribute to the success of PPP projects. Although 
this thesis topic relates specifically to toll roads, this section looks at success factors 
from a broad range of projects and sectors. 
Chua, Koh and Loh (1999) looked at key Critical Success Factors (CSFs) of PPP 
construction projects. This investigation focused on the success factors which are 
associated with the construction component of project delivery.  The study sought to 
identify the CSFs for construction projects based on accumulative knowledge and 
judgment of experts in the industry. Chua et al (1999) used an Analytical Hierarchy 
Process (AHP) to seek ‘consistent subjective expert judgement’. They then presented 
a hierarchical model for construction project success which was determined by a 
variety of factors pertaining to four main project aspects which were: project 
characteristics, contractual arrangements, project participants and interactive 
processes. These factors were broken down to give a further 67 factors.  
Using the AHP procedure, they developed a hierarchical model for construction 
project success. It was perceived that this systematic approach in soliciting the 
expert’s judgment and a consistency check, have made it a reliable way to determine 
the priorities to form a set of factors which may then be incorporated into other 
evaluation systems. As stated ‘the study exploits the AHP method to weight the 
relative importance of success-related factors to identify the CSFs among them.  
The main components of the hierarchical model were further broken up into further 
sub-hierarchies as shown figure 2. These sub-hierarchies were based upon a number 
of previous studies as identified in the literature.  
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Figure 2 – Success related factor considered in study by Chua et al (1999) 
 
A questionnaire was developed by Chua et al (1999) to obtain quantitative data from 
chosen ‘experienced’ practitioners. These practitioners were senior managers 
involved in the delivery of infrastructure in Singapore and from either construction 
companies, consultancies or statutory boards.   
The structure of the questionnaire and subsequent processing of the data allowed for 
the top 10 of each project’s objectives to be provided. The results showed that the 
project characteristics of economic risk and adequacy of funding were the most 
important CSFs. For contractual arrangements, the adequacy of plans and 
specification was ranked the most important. The project participants characteristic 
had the Project Manager as the most CSF while the interactive processes 
characteristic, had monitoring and control as the most important CSF. 
The paper concludes that critical success factors extend beyond the Project Manager, 
monitoring and control efforts. These additional factors for project success consist of 
understanding the characteristics of a project, having adequate contractual 
arrangements and having a competent management team.  
Although this study only looks at the construction component of project delivery, 
many of the critical components identified could be used within a success framework 
as construction will be a major component within a holistic review of infrastructure 
delivery.   
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In another paper, Zhang (2005) also recognised the importance of identifying those 
factors which contribute to the success of PPPs and the significance of enhancing 
those key attributes for future projects. Zhang identified that problems existed world-
wide in relation to the delivery of infrastructure using Public Private Partnerships 
(PPPs). He proposed that the ongoing worldwide trend towards PPPs creates the need 
for improved practices for their future delivery. Furthermore, that the development of 
such practices is dependent upon analysing and categorising the multiple factors that 
are critical to the success of PPPs. This formed the basis of his research to develop a 
suitable Critical Success Factor (CSF) package for PPPs based on a ‘public private 
win-win principle’.  
The research consisted of two components, firstly a literature review to identify 
previous research that classified CSFs, followed by an examination of previous 
successful projects along with lessons learnt of failing projects in both developed and 
developing countries. The second component was a quantitative assessment that used 
questionnaire surveys.  
Zhang (2005) proposed that PPPs are not merely a method for government to transfer 
all risk to the private sector and therefore remove all responsibility. Instead they 
require appropriate allocation and management of risks with a project procurement 
protocol based on a public private win-win principle which balances governmental 
supports and private sector inputs.  
The five critical success factors identified within Zhang’s research were (1) 
favourable investment environment, (2) economic viability, (3) a reliable 
concessionaire consortium with strong technical strength, (4) sound financial 
package, and (5) appropriate risk allocation via reliable contractual arrangements. An 
explanation of each factor is provided. Unlike Chua et al (1999), Zhang provided a 
model that looked at factors outside the construction component although one of the 
success factors include construction related factors. The CSFs were further broken up 
into success sub-factors (SSFs).  
The author had forty six questionnaire surveys completed by industry and academia 
respondents. These respondents were from 42 different organisations/institutions and 
a number of different countries. The questionnaire allowed for ‘world-wide expert 
opinions’ on the relative significance of the CSFs and SSFs using a scale of 0 to 5.  
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Based upon the results, the top five most significant for the SSFs under the CSF for 
‘favourable investment environment’ were (1) stable political system; (2) 
government support; (3) predicable and reasonable legal framework; (4) favourable 
economic system; (5) the project is well suited for privatisation. The top three SSFs 
under the CSF ‘economic viability’ were (1) long-term demand for the 
product/services offered by the project; (2) sufficient profitability of project to attract 
investors; and (3) long-term cash flow that is attractive to lenders. For the CSF 
‘reliable concessionaire consortium with strong technical strength’ the top five SSFs 
were (1) strong and capable project team; (2) good relationship with host government 
authorities; (3) leading role by key enterprise or entrepreneur; (4) effective project 
organisation structure; and (5) sound technical solution/cost effective technical 
solution. The top five most significant SSFs under the CSF ‘sound financial package’ 
were (1) appropriate toll/tariff levels and suitable adjustment formula; (2) sound 
financial analysis; (3) abilities to deal with fluctuations in interest/exchange rates; (4) 
sources and structures of main debts and standby facilities; and (5) long term debt 
financing that minimises refinancing risks. Finally, the top five SSFs under the CSF 
‘appropriate risk allocation via reliable contractual arrangements’ are (1) concession 
agreement; (2) loan agreement; (3) guarantees/support/ comfort letters; (4) supply 
agreement; and (5) operation agreement.  
The CSFs of PPP projects in the United Kingdom were investigate by Bing, 
Akintoye, Edwards and Hardcastle (2005).  Bing et al recognised that PPPs are 
increasingly being used in the United Kingdom and although there has been failures, 
projects have been undertaken successfully but the reasons for success are not 
entirely clear. The research identifies some of the procurement issues that have been 
reported such as the high costs in tendering, complex negotiation, cost restraints on 
innovation, and differing or conflicting objectives among the project stakeholders. 
However, it also perceived that projects have been regarded as successful and that 
previous research had sought to investigate what were the drivers of success. This 
forms the basis of the paper as it attempts explore the relative importance of critical 
success factors (CSFs) associated with construction PPP projects in the UK.    
The research used a literature review to compile 18 CSFs that were identified in 
previous studies from 1992 to 2002. The 18 CSFs were then compiled into a 
questionnaire survey instrument. The survey was then undertaken by UK 
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organisations that were involved with Private Finance Initiatives (PFI). A total 64 
surveys were received from 500 distributed. The breakup of the respondents was 16 
from the public sector and 45 form the private sector. The intent of the survey was to 
test the relative importance of the 18 CSFs identified from the literature review 
explored by means of Likert rating scale questions in the survey instrument. 
The 18 CSFs identified were strong private consortium, appropriate risk allocation 
and risk sharing, competitive procurement process, commitment/responsibility of 
public/private sectors, thorough and realistic cost/benefit assessment, project 
technical feasibility, transparency in the procurement process, good governance, 
favourable legal framework, available financial market, political support, multi-
benefit objectives, government involvement by providing guarantees, sound 
economic policy, stable macro-economic environment, well-organised public 
agency, shared authority between public and private sectors and social support.  
The results showed different perceptions of the most important CSFs between the 
public and private sector. In the private sector the top five CSFs were strong private 
consortium, appropriate risk allocation and risk sharing, commitment/responsibility 
of public/private sectors, available finance market and thorough realistic/benefit 
assessment. While the private sectors top five were competitive procurement process, 
good governance, political support, well organised public support and strong private 
consortium. Of the total respondents the top five CSFs were strong private 
consortium, appropriate risk allocation and risk sharing, available finance market, 
commitment/responsibility of public/private sectors and thorough realistic/benefit 
assessment. It should be noted as the survey respondents were 25% public sector and 
75% private sector the results are skewed toward the private sector.  
Further investigation is done by using factor analysis to ‘identify a relatively small 
number of factor groupings that can be used to represent relationships among sets of 
many inter-related variables’. The residual 17 CSFs were grouped into five principal 
factors and interpreted as follows: effective procurement, project implement-ability, 
government guarantee, favourable economic conditions and available financial 
market. This revealed five factor groupings (accounting for about 70% of the overall 
variances between factors) for CSFs for UK construction PPP/PFI projects.  
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Bing et al (2005) concludes that the three factors: a strong private consortium, 
appropriate risk allocation available financial market emerge as being the most 
important in the development of successful UK PPP/ PFI projects. 
Garvin (2007) completed research that looked to determine whether PPPs were 
effective in delivering infrastructure. The research differed from the previous 
literature as it proposed that the competing interests of participants had to reach an 
overall equilibrium for PPP projects to be successful overall.  
He proposed that the Public Private Partnership (PPP) movement is arguably the 
most significant worldwide trend in the public sector. This is being driven by the 
interplay between three factors which are: general reluctance by governments to raise 
taxes; the advent of private sector participants that are willing and capable of 
handling the risks and delivering the services of infrastructure; the realisation that 
pension fund and institutional investment managers of the attractiveness of privately 
financed infrastructure projects to the risk/return requirements of their clientele.  
The research is motivated by two questions. Firstly, are PPP outcomes better than, or 
at least equal to, more traditional infrastructure development and management 
strategies? And secondly, what is necessary for this market to develop and realise its 
potential?  
Garvin takes a particular perspective of the PPP movement which is based on past 
and current research by others and his involvement in case based research of large 
infrastructure projects. From this, two fundamental propositions have been produced 
which form the basis of the current work. These propositions are:  
Proposition I – the basic objectives of a PPP programme is to nurture the 
development of this market and to sustain its existence. To do so, a PPP programme 
must establish equilibrium among four environments: (1) state, (2) society, (3) 
industry, and (4) the market. 
Proposition II – projects are the operational expression of any PPP Programme. As 
such any particular project can either maintain the equilibrium of the overall 
programme or distort it. Further the collective performance of all projects will 
determine whether the PPP Programme is effective as a strategy or policy for 
infrastructure development and management. Each PPP project should provide 
14 
 
marginal improvement in one or more of the following areas: (a) quality of service; 
(b) price/cost of service; (c) time of service availability; (d) level of environmental 
impacts; and (e) equitable distribution of social benefits  
From these propositions, Garvin goes on to present an Equilibrium framework 
consisting of four continuums (state, society , industry and market), four quadrants 
(social interests, industry interests, market interests and state interest) and a central 
zone called the range of balance. This is shown conceptually in Figure 3. 
 
 
 
Figure 3 – PPP Equilibrium frame work as proposed by Garvin (2007)  
 
This equilibrium framework is used as the basis for the central hypothesis of the 
work where Garvin proposes that the scatter of a programme’s project must cluster 
within the ‘range of balance’. In other words any programme for delivery of 
infrastructure must balance the requirement of socials interests, state interests, 
market interest and industry interest. It is then suggested that if the balance is not 
maintained then the programme will suffer from bias towards a particular quadrant. 
The framework therefore assists in establishing boundaries for the overall 
programme and also provides a platform for plotting the general location of each 
project and evaluating a programme’s evolution. 
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The research methodology uses a longitudinal, case based approach to study the 
effectiveness of programmes by using the frame work shown in figure 3 as the basis 
evaluation of effectiveness. The analytical technique breaks up the evaluation into 
two components which are the Enabling Legislation template and the Project 
Appraisal template. The two components are then broken up into further elements. 
The appraisal technique then involves classifying whether the specified project 
programme element within the evaluation moves towards one of the four quadrants 
in the equilibrium figure or results in no movement. This technique is extremely 
subjective and very precise, however Garvin notes the intention of the framework is 
to serve a guide to channel the assessment effort and not as an instrument to pin point 
the exact location.  
The framework is applied to a Case Study which is the AB680 programme in 
California. The programme consisted of delivering infrastructure using the private 
sector to develop and finance projects. This evaluation concludes that the programme 
is outside of balance as bias tends toward market and industry interests.  
Garvin concludes that the PPP movement in the USA has a long way to go in 
understanding PPP arrangements. Sub-optimal outcomes not fixed with the PPP 
framework are able to encourage private and public sectors to play to their strengths 
which can result in balancing the interests of state, society, industry and market. 
Garvin’s framework is further used by Bosso and Garvin (2008) to complete an 
assessment of six other toll road case studies in the United States. This paper is 
essentially the same research that Garvin presented in 2007 with additional case 
studies that further demonstrate the application of the assessment framework. The 
additional toll road case studies included the I-81 Fluor Virginia, 1-81 STAR 
solutions, Pocahontas Pkwy 1, Pocahontas Pkwy 2, SR 91 Express Lanes and the 
Dulles Greenway. Of these case studies only two projects remained in the ‘range of 
balance’ with remaining case studies having ‘bias’ towards industry interests. Refer 
to figure 4 for the mapping of all case studies. In addition based on the commentary 
in the paper the two projects located within the ‘range of balance’ could be classified 
as successful.   
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Figure 4 – Map of case studies within Equilibrium Framework (Garvin & Bosso 
2008)  
 
Osei-Kyei and Chan (2015) completed a review of studies completed on CSFs for 
PPPs from 1990 to 2013. The researchers identified that the Critical Success Factors 
for Public-Private Partnerships is a major research interest worldwide and as a result 
the paper aims to methodically review studies on the CSFs for implementing PPPs. 
The research methodology consisted of a three stage search process which comprised 
; identification of academic journals, selection of target papers and examination of 
targets papers. Identification was completed using the ‘Scopus’ search engine. 
Selection of the target papers involved a more visual and comprehensive search in all 
the selected journals. The papers retrieved from the target journal were subjected to 
the ‘content analysis technique’ to determine all features of the publications. The 
features included authors’ origin/country, active contributors, countries of research 
focus, findings from the publications and methodologies adopted.   A total of twenty 
seven papers were identified as being relevant and examined as target papers.  
The total number the CSFs identified in the twenty seven papers is shown in figure 5.   
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Figure 5 – critical success factors 1990 to 2013 as reviewed by Osei-Kyei & Chan (2015) 
 
The top five identified CSFs from the analysis were appropriate risk allocation and 
sharing, strong private consortium, political support, public/community support and 
transparent procurement.    
As commented on in the paper, the identification of ‘appropriate risk allocation and 
sharing’ is not surprising as this is one of the fundamental components of PPP 
arrangements.  Osei-Kyei and Chan make further comment that although this is a 
feature of the model, it is important for governments to refrain from the idea of 
transferring all risk as this could affect the progress or future participation. This 
comment is consistent with Garvin’s (2007) equilibrium model where he proposes 
that the PPP arrangement cannot be biased towards any of the four continuums (state, 
society, industry and market). The transferring of all risk to the private sector could 
result in the equilibrium being compromised which may then affect the ongoing 
viability of the programme.  
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The ‘strong private consortium’ CSF highlights that any group undertaking a PPP 
must be equipped with strong technical, operational and managerial capacity to 
undertake work. The ‘political support’ factor is critical, as without this support 
approval will not be granted for public expenditure on public projects. This is 
supported by the recent cancelling of the East-West Link in Melbourne where the 
change of government resulted in the cancelling of the project although the contract 
for the project had been awarded.  
The public/community support factor is identified as significant as the publics’ 
perception of a project can affect is delivery through such issues a land acquisitions. 
Finally the transparent procurement factor again relates to public perception which 
can also effect the successful implementation of projects.  
The analysis also covered a review of the methodologies used to establish CSFs in 
the twenty seven publications. Case studies were the most favoured at 41% followed 
by questionnaire survey at 37% and mixed methods at the remaining 22%.  
2.2 The success of PPP projects in Australia - Discussion 
 
The literature reviewed, relates to the identification of success factors from a 
combination of case studies of PPP projects and the completion of questionnaires by 
people involved in the delivery of PPPs. Other than Garvin’s (2007) work, none of 
the papers specifically focus on toll roads and even Garvin’s case studies were 
located in the United States. Hodge (2005) completed a general evaluation of the 
CityLink toll road in Melbourne and the M2 motorway in Sydney. Hodge 
commented that the CityLink project successfully transferred the majority of risk to 
the private sector and that government avoided the majority of legal conflicts. Based 
on the previously identified CSFs, this can be viewed as a level of success (Parts of 
the project identified as having shortcomings were; the political governance of the 
project due to the lack of protection of consumers). This can be related back to the 
findings of Osei-Kyei and Chan who found that ‘transparent procurement’ was in the 
top five of CSFs identified in the twenty seven journals reviewed. As with the 
CityLink project, Hodge once again criticises the governance the M2 motorway 
delivery. Using evidence from the Macquarie Bank’s website (the financiers of the 
motorway) Hodge details the large returns experienced by investors alluding to the 
government not getting the best deal for consumers. Based on this he proposes that 
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the perception that governments are prone to making bad business deals for the sake 
of delivering conspicuous projects to voters is understandable.   
In recent times one of the most significant issues facing toll roads in Australia has 
been the financial failure of projects due to the inaccuracy of patronage forecasting. 
The patron forecasting used during the bid process forms the basis of the viability of 
the project. A range of literature has been written by academics in relation to 
patronage forecasting. Zheng and Hensher (2010) presented a paper which 
investigated the characteristics and demand forecasts in Australia. The first part of 
the study consists of a summary of all toll roads in Australia which details the length, 
tolls rates, years opened, operators(s) and payment alternatives. The second part 
looks at the accuracy of the traffic forecasts. The results showed a significant 
negative error for the ‘Year 1 forecasting performance’ for the toll roads assessed. 
The results included the M2 -32.8%, M7 -51.8%, Cross City Tunnel -51.1%, Lane 
Cove Tunnel -37% and Eastlink -45%.  
Black (2014) has completed research looking at traffic risk in toll roads in Australia. 
As Zheng and Hensher had done, he presents a summary of the ratio of forecasted 
opening volumes versus actual opening volumes. The summary presents slightly 
different ratios to Zheng and Hensher and shows that the Eastern Distributor 
achieved the highest ratio of 0.82 which means it had the closest match for forecast 
versus actual. Refer to figure 6 for comparison of daily versus forecast traffic 
volumes.  
 
 
 
Figure 6 – Traffic forecast vs actual  on Australian Toll Roads  (Black 2013)  
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Black proposes three problems with traffic modelling in Australia. The first issue 
relates to the recognised errors in the modelling approach to strategic land use and 
strategic planning. Secondly he proposes that models rely on ‘exogenous’ inputs like 
future population distributions which are difficult to predict. The third problem he 
identifies is that Australian traffic consultants pay no attention to the research and 
development undertaken into the assumptions supporting the models they are using 
along with their inaccuracies. He finally concludes that ‘in the Australian experience 
traffic projections for most toll roads have been built around the financial model, not 
vice versa as it should be’. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
21 
 
Chapter 3 – Evaluation and Appraisal Framework  
 
3.1 Introduction and justification of Evaluation and Appraisal   
Framework   
 
As identified in Chapter 1, nine success factors have been chosen as the basis for 
evaluating success. In order to standardise the case studies, a review template has 
been developed which provides a tool to test the nominated success factors against 
the case studies. Responses to the questions and statements provided for each factor 
will be used to assess the performance of each case study.  
The success factors-appropriate risk allocation and sharing, strong private 
consortium, political support, public/community support and transparency of 
procurement have been taken from the Osei-Kyei research who identified the top five 
success factors from twenty seven research papers completed between 1990 and 
2013.  
Economic Viability was chosen as having significant relevance to the Australian Toll 
Road Sector due to the financial failure of multiple toll roads in Sydney and 
Brisbane. Economic viability was also identified by Zhang as one of the top five 
‘critical success factors’.  
Environmental outcomes and Economic contribution to the cities/regions in which 
these projects are constructed were selected as, although not significantly covered by 
the literature review, it can be argued that they are one of the main drivers for 
Governments to construct toll roads. In terms of public perception these factors can 
be characterised as being of the foremost importance.  
Finally, additional success factors identified outside of the frame work that are 
considered significant will be detailed as part of the assessment.  
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3.1.1 Evaluation and Appraisal Framework   
 
Item Success Factors  and Sub-Success Factor Appraisal 
Criteria   
Assessment  
1 Risk allocation and sharing 
 Were the major risks allocated to the party best able to 
manage it?  
 Did government refrain from the idea of transferring all 
project risk to the private sector?  
 Did the public partner retain risks that obviously went 
beyond the control of the private sector?  
 
 
2 Strength of private consortium. 
 Was the construction company component of the consortium 
large and well established?  
 Was the consortium equipped with strong technical, 
operational and managerial capacity to undertake the 
project?  
 Did the consortia (Private contractor concessionaire) have 
easy access to the financial market with the associated 
benefits of lower financial costs? 
 Was the winning consortium proposal a Cost effective 
technical solution? 
 
 
3 Political Support. 
 Did the government (previous and current) have a positive 
political attitude towards the private sector involved in the 
infrastructure project? 
 Where there existing government policy for the management 
of PPPs?  
 Had the project been part of a long term transport plan?  
 Was political backing strong and did the government at the 
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Item Success Factors  and Sub-Success Factor Appraisal 
Criteria   
Assessment  
time ‘sell’ the project?  
 
4 Public/Community Support. 
 Project acceptance and understanding by the public 
community be it media, trade unions, non-governmental 
organisations 
 Did host government create awareness and undertake public 
education? 
 Did the project have political capital? 
 Where community concerns addressed during planning and 
construction phases 
 Was the public perception of the project positive or negative 
 
 
 
5 Transparency of Procurement. 
 Tendering process that ensured value for money through 
competitive bidding process?  
 Level of communication with stakeholders 
 Public and private sections transparent and open to the 
external stakeholders 
 
 
6 Economic Viability. 
 Accuracy of the traffic volumes – Forecast versus actual  
 Effect of actual traffic volumes on financial performance, 
short term and long term 
 Forecast Traffic volumes and financial model 
 
 
7 Environmental outcomes. 
 Reduction in traffic congestion 
 Reduced air and noise pollution 
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Item Success Factors  and Sub-Success Factor Appraisal 
Criteria   
Assessment  
 Removal of traffic from local streets 
 Improvement of visual and environmental amenity  
 
 
8 Economic contribution to the cities/regions in which 
they are constructed. 
 More efficient movement of freight resulting in economic 
benefits 
 Improvement to service delivery to the business districts 
along the corridor 
 General reduction in travel times for road users resulting 
greater efficiency 
 
 
9 Additional factors identified during research 
 
 
 
25 
 
Chapter 4 – Case Studies  
 
4.1 Eastern Distributor (Sydney) 
 
4.1.1 Introduction  
 
The Eastern Distributor had been proposed for decades in a variety of forms however 
it was not until 1995 that the project was initiated. This was the result of a change in 
the New South Wales state government in March 1995 where the incoming Labour 
Government lead by Bob Carr promised its construction. The final alignment is 
shown in figure 7. The intent of the project was to relieve the transport corridor 
between Sydney’s Central Business District and the Sydney Airport of its myriad of 
traffic problems. It was also intended to reduce traffic on local streets and improve 
the area’s visual and environmental amenity (RTA 1998).  
Expressions of Interest were called for in 1994 with three consortiums submitting 
proposals for the project. The three consortiums consisted of: 
1. Transfield and Babcock & Brown 
2. Leighton Contractors, Macquarie Corporate Finance and NAB (as the sole 
debt arranger) 
3. Baulderstone Hornibrook advised by the Commonwealth Bank of Australia  
In August 1996, Airport Motorway Limited (AML) was officially endorsed by the 
government as the preferred proponent. The AML private consortium consisted of 
Leighton Contractors as the constructor and Macquarie Bank as the financiers. AML 
would own and operate the Eastern Distributor, with a licence to charge tolls until 
2048 and after this time it would revert back to the public sector.  
Construction commenced in August 1997 and the Motorway opened in December 
1999 with a construction cost of $700 million.  
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Figure 7 – Route of Eastern Distributor (Source: RTA Summary of Contracts 1998) 
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4.1.2 Background  
 
The following background information to the Eastern Distributor which details the 
evolution of the project has been adapted from the RTA document ‘Eastern 
Distributor – Summary of Contracts 1998’ and from the Ozroads document 
‘Cahill/Eastern Distributor/Eastern Freeway: History and Development’.  
The Eastern Distributor has an extensive history spanning over four decades from 
initial concept to the actual start of construction in 1997. This included multiple on 
surface and tunnel schemes.  
The Eastern Distributor was first proposed in 1951 as part of the County of 
Cumberland Scheme and was envisaged as part of a ring road system around the city 
centre. The intention was to collect and disperse traffic from freeways radiating from 
the city and therefore bypass city streets.   
In the early 1970s a major assessment of Sydney’s transport requirement was 
complete, this was called the Sydney Area Transportation Study (SATS). The study 
envisaged the Eastern Distributor as a surface freeway with underpasses at William 
Street and Oxford Street. The SATS also resulted in many of the freeways proposed 
in the County of Cumberland Scheme being abandoned. The government however 
retained the Eastern Distributor as a crucial proposed by-pass of the city centre.  
Considerable change had occurred with the nature of transport and traffic problems 
on the eastern side of the city between the 1950s and the 1970s. The completion of 
the Cahill Freeway and the upgrading of Southern Cross Drive in this time along the 
general growth of car ownership had resulted in greatly increased traffic volumes in 
the inner eastern suburbs. This was a result of the increased traffic volumes having to 
travel through the suburbs of Woolloomooloo, Darlinghurst, East Sydney, Surry 
Hills and East Redfern when traveling from the Harbour Bridge/Cahill Freeway to 
the eastern and southern sides of the city.  
The Eastern Distributor was further considered in the late 1970s with the emphasis 
being on addressing the impact of traffic on local roads between the Cahill 
Expressway and Southern Cross Drive.  
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In 1984 the Department of Main Roads (DMR) which later became the RTA 
proposed to construct the Eastern Distributor in a trench, as envisaged by the SATS, 
with underpasses at William Street an Oxford Street (Taylor Square). The proposal 
resulted in a strong negative response from the community due the impact on the 
area along with the displacement of hundreds of residents 
In following year in response to perceived impact on the area, the DMR exhibited an 
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for an amended scheme which shad tunnels 
from North of William Street to the intersection of South Dowling Street, Moore 
Park Road and Anzac Parade. This scheme consisted of three stages with only Stage 
1 being completed in 1987, this consisted of the William Street Underpass. Stages 2 
and 3 were not constructed due to escalating costs.  
In 1994 the RTA investigated the feasibility and desirability of operating the Eastern 
Distributor as a toll road. This was a result of a number of factors exacerbating the 
traffic problems in the inner eastern suburbs since the EIS in 1985, these factors 
were; 
 Completion of the Sydney Harbour Tunnel in 1992 which further increased 
traffic flow through the inner eastern suburbs  
 Completion of the third runway at Sydney Airport which increased domestic and 
overseas air travel which increased the significance of the route from the city 
centre to airport along with the North Shore an Eastern Suburbs. 
 The emergence of the “crescent” between Chatswood and the Airport/Central 
Industrial Area/Port Botany as the central focus of Sydney’s post-industrial focus 
had placed more pressure on the Eastern Distributor corridor.  
 The increasing population of the inner suburbs due to the availability of obsolete 
industrial land and the construction of the New Southern Railway.  
 The increased community awareness of environmental issues and the increasing 
reluctance to tolerate high volumes of traffic on residential streets. 
 
The study concluded that although there was many details to resolve there was 
widespread support for a freeway and a willingness for motorists to pay for the travel 
benefits it would provide.  
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In May 1994 the Capital Works Committee of the NSW state government approved 
the issuing by the RTA of invitations to the private sector to submit preliminary 
proposals to finance, design, construct and maintain the Eastern of Distributor. Of the 
five proposal received in December 1994, three proponents were shortlisted to 
develop and submit a detailed proposal. As detailed in Chapter 4.1.1 Airport 
Motorway Limited was selected as the preferred proponents to own and operate the 
toll road for a period of 48 years. It should be noted that the original concession 
period was 38 years however the period was extended 10 years to cover the costs of 
$140 million of environmental improvements requested from the RTA as a result of 
the Environmental Impact Statement.  
 
The final scheme as detailed in the Guidelines for Proponents consisted of “Twin two 
lane tunnels and approaches connecting the Cahill Expressway to South Dowling 
Street, Moore Park Road and Anzac Parade with grade separations at: 
 Sir John Young Crescent  
 William Street  
 Connections to Anzac Parade and Moore Park Road  
4.1.3 The Current Status of the Eastern Distributor  
 
Airport Motorway Limited (AML) remains the owner and operator of The Eastern 
Distributor. The toll road is managed on behalf of the AML investors by the 
Transurban Group and operates a cash less tolling system. Transurban Group are also 
a majority stakeholder in AML with a 75% share.  
A report in the Australian Financial Review in June 2013 stated that it was believed 
that the internal rate of return on the Eastern Distributor has been about 45 per cent 
(Boyd 2013). The healthy financial state of the toll road is reinforced by the Moody’s 
Investors Services ‘Rating Action’ in the same year which affirmed Airport 
Motorways Trusts (AMT is the financing vehicle for the Airport Motorway Limited) 
A3 rating and stable outlook.  Moody’s made further comment that the A3 rating 
reflected that the strengths of Airport Motorway Groups (AMGs) business profile 
which includes its essential nature in the road network, mature traffic profile and 
supportive features in the concession agreement (Moody’s 2013).  
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4.1.4 Measurement against Proposed Framework using Appraisal Template  
 
Item Success Factors  and Sub-Success Factor Appraisal 
Criteria   
Assessment  
1 Risk allocation and sharing 
 Were the major risks allocated to the party best able to 
manage it?  
 Did government refrain from the idea of transferring all 
project risk to the private sector?  
 Did the public partner retain risks that obviously went 
beyond the control of the private sector?  
 
AML and the Trustees obligation under the Deed were to:  
Finance, Design, Construct, Operate, Maintain & Repair the ED for 48 year 
concession period. 
AML accepted the following risks; 
 Cost of project may be greater  
 AML revenue may be less than they estimated  
 Traffic volumes may be less than estimated  
 Assumption under ‘base case’ financial model may be incorrect 
Based on the above;  
 The risks other than the traffic volumes were allocated to the consortium 
which had the best capacity to manage them. 
 Government transferred all construction and operation risk to the 
consortium however  
 RTA were required not to build any opposing arterial roads and 
recognise the importance of the ED in the Sydney Metropolitan traffic 
system so the public partner retained risks that obviously went control 
of AML  
 Consortium took risks on traffic volumes which could be argued as 
beyond the control of AML. Based on the evidence in Chapter 4.1.3 it 
appears the road patronage was under estimated meaning if the 
government took the risk on this they would be getting better value for 
money 
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Item Success Factors  and Sub-Success Factor Appraisal 
Criteria   
Assessment  
2 Strength of private consortium. 
 Was the construction company component of the consortium 
large and well established?  
 Was consortium equipped with strong technical, operational 
and managerial capacity to undertake the project?  
 Did the consortia (Private contractor concessionaire) have 
easy access to the financial market with the associated 
benefits of lower financial costs? 
 Was the winning consortium proposal a Cost effective 
technical solution? 
 
 Eastern Distributor Consortium (Airport Motorway Limited) consisted 
of Leighton Contractors as the constructors and Macquarie Back as the 
financiers. 
 Leighton Contractors are a large multinational Construction Company 
so the construction component of the consortium was large, and well 
established 
 Macquarie Bank were and still are substantial participants in toll road 
financing  
 Based on the strength of the two participants the consortium had a 
strong technical, operational capacity to undertake the project  
 Macquarie Bank due to their standing had easy access to the financial 
markets 
 As the procurement process was competitive tender (Construction 
component was design and construct) it can be said the technical 
solution was cost effective from the perspective that it was the cheapest 
of the three proposals.  
3 Political Support. 
 Did the government (previous and current) have a positive 
political attitude towards the private sector involved in the 
infrastructure project? 
 Where there existing government policy for the management 
of PPPs?  
 Had the project been part of a long term transport plan?  
 Was political backing strong and did the government at the 
time ‘sell’ the project?  
 
 No specific evidence of negative political attitude towards the private 
sector consortium however previous infrastructure works including toll 
roads had been completed in NSW using PPP arrangements prior to the 
ED.  
 Revised Guidelines on private sector involvement in public 
infrastructure projects were issued in Sept 1995, these were a response 
to the Audit Office findings on the M2. Revised Guidelines were not 
applied to the ED as commitment to project was made in March 1995. 
 Eastern Distributor had been part of a long term traffic plan. Concept 
conceived in the 1950s as part of Eastern freeway, many proposals 
made until final tunnel configuration.  
 Ongoing political support to construct the ED. Stage 1 of alternative 
scheme constructed in the early 1990s however remaining stages were 
not constructed due to cost escalation. ED was election promise of Bob 
Carr in 1995 in which he became premier.  
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Item Success Factors  and Sub-Success Factor Appraisal 
Criteria   
Assessment  
4 Public/Community Support. 
 Project acceptance and understanding by the public 
community be it media, trade unions, non-governmental 
organisations 
 Did host government create awareness and undertake public 
education  
 Did the project have political capital?  
 Where community concerns addressed during planning and 
construction phases?  
 Was the public perception of the project positive or 
negative?  
 
 RTA completed a feasibility and desirability study in 1994 with the 
study concluding while there where issues to resolve there was 
generally wide support for the ED. 
 Government did create awareness and undertake public education 
through the EIS (Environmental Impact Statement) process 
 Project had political capital as demonstrated by Bob Carr making it an 
election promise. Successive governments had failed to deliver the 
project for whatever reason since its inception in the 1950s.   
 Community concerns were addressed during the planning phase with the 
design addressing submissions received in response to the EIS. 
Modifications resulted in additional project costs of $140 million.  
 Public perception generally positive due to the impact it had removing 
large traffic volumes from the inner eastern suburbs of Woolloomooloo, 
Darlinghurst, East Sydney and Redfern. Some negative perception due 
to tolls as Bob Carr had originally promised a toll free ED 
 
5 Transparency of Procurement. 
 Tendering process that ensured value for money through 
competitive bidding process  
 Level of communication with stakeholders  
 Public and private sections transparent and open to the 
external stakeholders 
 
 Competitive tender process undertaken with three consortiums 
submitting proposals. 
 EIS design changes were not competitively tendered due to time 
constraints with having the ED completed before the Sydney Olympics 
in 2000.  
 Summary of Contract provided by RTA in 1998 in accordance with 
NSW Governments Guidelines for Private Sector Participation in the 
Provision of Public Infrastructure  
 Performance Audit Report completed by the NSW Audit Office in 1997 
to examine the processes that have been applied by the RTA to deliver 
the ED.  
6 Economic Viability. 
 Accuracy of the traffic volumes – Forecast versus actual  
 Effect of actual traffic volumes on financial performance, 
short term and long term 
 Initial traffic volumes were 27,000 Average Daily Traffic (ADT) 
compared to the 33,000 ADT forecast  
 It appears the long term traffic volumes were underestimated with 
reports that that the internal rate of return is 45%. If correct the 
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Item Success Factors  and Sub-Success Factor Appraisal 
Criteria   
Assessment  
 Forecast Traffic volumes and Financial model  
 Did the public receive value for money?  
 
erroneous traffic forecast has had a positive impact on the financial 
model.  
 Based on the above the public is not receiving value for money as the 
returns are not what should be reasonably expected. If the higher 
volumes were known this may have been reciprocated in reduced tolls 
or a reduced concession period  
7 Environmental outcomes. 
 Reduction in traffic congestion  
 Reduced air and noise pollution  
 Removal of traffic from local streets 
 Improvement of visual and environmental amenity  
 
 
Some of the Environmental Outcomes of the project were/are: 
 Reduced traffic on inner eastern city streets  
 Less traffic noise and air pollution  
 Improved local access in the inner eastern suburbs with the  
 Improved amenity on local streets due to traffic calming measures  
 General improvement to area with increase in shops and cafes on street 
which previously had high levels of traffic and congestion  
 
8 Economic contribution to the cities/regions in which 
they are constructed. 
 More efficient movement of freight resulting in economic 
benefits  
 Improvement to service delivery to the business districts 
along the corridor 
 General reduction in travel times for road users resulting 
greater efficiency 
 
The EIS gave the following economic benefits  
 Reduced travel time savings (this is identified as the biggest single 
economic benefit and is much greater than all economic costs) 
 Reduced accidents  
 Amenity improvements resulting increased property values  
 Residual value of the ED asset as the end of the study period 
 
The EIS also provided the following cost benefit ratios from multiple 
economic valuations of the project  
 Original EIS Statement, Nov 1996                  – 2.3  
 RTA Representative Report, April 1997         – 1.7 
 RTA EIS Revised Economical Analysis 
Report, June 1997                                            –  4.5 
 EIS by Director-General, Department  
Of Urban Affairs and Planning June 1997       – 3.0 
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Item Success Factors  and Sub-Success Factor Appraisal 
Criteria   
Assessment  
9 Additional factors identified during research 
 
No additional factors of significance identified. 
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4.1.5 Conclusion  
 
The Eastern Distributor when measured against the proposed framework 
demonstrated strengths in all of the appraisal criteria. The strongest component of the 
toll road appears to be the Economic Contribution it makes to the city of Sydney and 
the Environmental outcomes it made the by removing large traffic volumes from the 
inner eastern suburbs. The toll road has a high level of economic viability however as 
the reported rates of return are so high the public are not receiving value for money. 
An increased level of value may have been received by the government taking on the 
patronage risk within the Public Private Partnership delivery model.   
Due to the duration between the project’s inception and its actual delivery, a high 
level of community and public support was evident - the project had evolved over 40 
years. The majority of the procurement process was completed within the 
Government guidelines however due to the time constraints caused by a need to meet 
the Sydney Olympics in 2000 the design changes resulting from the EIS submissions 
could not be competitively tendered.  
Based on the assessment, this project has the required factors for success which is 
supported by its ongoing prosperity and continuing positive impact on its 
surrounding environment.  
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4.2 Cross City Tunnel (Sydney) 
 
4.2.1 Introduction  
 
The Cross City Tunnel is a 2.1 km-long twin-tunnel tollway located in Sydney which 
is currently owned and operated by Transurban. The tunnel connects Darling 
Harbour on the Western fringe of the Central Business District to Rushcutters Bay in 
the Eastern Suburbs. The toll road also connects to the north and south bound lanes 
of the Eastern Distributor as shown in figure 8.  
Construction for the tunnel commenced in January 2003 with the toll way opening to 
traffic on the 28
th
 August 2005. The toll road was Sydney's first completely 
electronic tollway with no capacity to manually collect cash tolls.  
The project has been contentious since its inception with the main issue being 
patronage. The toll road was placed into administration within two years of opening 
which followed its sale in the same year. The tunnel went into receivership for a 
second time in 2013 and was sold to Transurban in 2014.  
 
Figure 8 – CCT horizontal alignment (Source RTA Summary of Contracts 2008) 
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4.2.2 Background  
 
The concept of the Cross City Tunnel had existed since 1990 with numerous 
proposals since that time being created for an east west tunnel under the Sydney 
CBD. The basic concept for the final design was developed by the RTA from the 
mid-1990s. The preliminary concepts proposed by the RTA involved much shorter 
two lane tunnels than the final design however both of them passed under Druitt and 
Park Streets. The key events in the history of the Cross City Tunnel can be found in 
Table 1 which gives a brief overview in chronological order of the important stages.  
 
Date Event 
1990 The State Government and City of Sydney Council propose a tunnel under 
Park Street leading to an underground car park and bus interchange. 
1995 City of Sydney Council propose a tunnel from the Western Distributor under 
Market Street and Hyde Park connecting to William Street near Boomerang 
Street. 
22 Oct 
1998 
Premier (Mr Carr) and Minister for Roads (Mr Scully) release an exhibition 
for comment on the initial concept (the ‘short tunnel’) in a 16 page report 
titled The Cross City Tunnel: Improving the Heart of the City. $2.00 toll is 
flagged. 
April 1999 The City of Sydney Council releases the Cross City Tunnel Alternative 
Scheme. This was a longer tunnel than proposed in the 1998 Improving the 
Heart of the City, running to the eastern end of the Kings Cross Tunnel, 
including narrowing William Street. 
22 July 
1999 
Director General of Planning issues requirements for the preparation of the 
initial EIS by letter to the RTA. 
24 Sept to 
11 Dec 
1999 
The RTA publishes the modified proposal in the brochure Cross City Tunnel, 
Environment Assessment. 
Nov 1999 The Action for Transport 2010 plan released is and includes the project in 
section titled, ‘Making space for cyclists and walkers’. 
2 Aug 2000 The RTA releases the Cross City Tunnel Environmental Impact Statement for 
public comment. 
15 Sept 
2000 
The RTA invites Registrations of Interest from the private sector parties ‘for 
the financing, design, construction, operation and maintenance of the Cross 
City Tunnel project’ (Cross City Tunnel: Summary of Contracts, June 2003, 
p 10). 
6 Oct 2000 Closing date for submissions to the EIS. 
23 Oct 
2000 
Closing date for registrations of interest to construct and operate the tunnel. 
Feb 2001 Minister for Roads (Mr Scully) announces that 3 consortia have been short 
listed to prepare detailed proposals: Cross City Motorways (CCM), E-TUBE 
and Sydney City Tunnel Company. 
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Date Event 
14 May 
2001 
The RTA submits the Preferred Activity Report to the Department of Urban 
Affairs and Planning (DUAP) with a Cross City Tunnel Representations 
Report. 
19 May to 
18 June 
2001 
Preferred Activity Report, containing more than 20 modifications to the 
proposal as presented in the EIS, publicly exhibited. 
16 Aug 
2001 
RTA presents an Addendum to the Representations Report to the DUAP. 
Sept 2001 The Proposed Cross City Tunnel: Director General’s Report, as required 
under s115C of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act is 
submitted to the Minister for Urban Affairs and Planning. 
3 Oct 2001 Planning approval, including 240 conditions, is granted by the Minister of 
Urban Affairs and Planning (Dr Refshauge). 
Oct 2001 Detailed proposals for implementation of the project lodged by the three 
consortia and reviewed by assessment panel. 
Feb 2002 Budget Committee of Cabinet approves CCM to be selected as preferred 
proponent and for the CCM ‘long 80 tunnel’ option to be selected as the 
preferred proposal. 
27 Feb 
2002 
Minister for Roads (Mr Scully) announces CCM is the preferred proponent. 
The tender submission from CCM incorporated changes to the Approved 
Activity that the Minister for Roads considered would provide more benefits 
and reduce construction related impacts to the community. As a result of the 
proposed changes a number of additional environmental impacts would 
occur. A supplementary EIS is prepared. 
14 Mar 
2002 
Letter from the Treasurer (Mr Egan) to the Minister for Roads (Mr Scully) 
stating ‘A key objective of the project has been its development at no net cost 
to Government’ and ‘It is not certain as this time that the project can achieve 
a ‘no net cost’ to Government’ outcome. If the project cannot proceed 
without a Government contribution, any such contribution would need to be 
funded out of the RTA’s existing forward capital program’. 
30 Jul to 
31 Aug 
2002 
Supplementary Environmental Impact Statement goes on public display. 
Displayed at 19 locations and the RTA website, with a toll free number for 
public comment. 25,000 copies of the brochure were distributed. 
4 Nov 2002 Supplementary Cross City Tunnel Representations Report was submitted by 
the RTA to DUAP drafted in response to the Supplementary EIS, as a result 
of additional studies and community feedback. Further alterations to the 
project proposed. 
25 Nov 
2002 
Supplementary Cross City Tunnel Representations Report released to the 
public. The right hand turn out of Cowper Wharf Road was reinstated. The 
report was displayed at 19 locations and the RTA website, with a toll free 
information line. 5,000 copies of the brochure were distributed. 
Dec 2002 Cross City Tunnel: Proposed Modifications of Approved Project – Director 
General’s Report was completed. 
12 Dec 
2002 
Planning approval granted by the Minister for Planning (Dr Refshauge). 
Approved route twice the length of the 1998 initial concept. Projected 
approval subject to 292 Conditions of Approval. 
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Date Event 
16 Dec 
2002 
Approval given by the Treasurer (Mr Egan) to sign project deed, under 
Public Authorities (Financial Arrangements) Act 1987. 
18 Dec 
2002 
Contract between CCM consortium and RTA is signed, to finance, construct, 
operate and maintain the CCT. Differential tolling, $2.50 per car and $5.00 
for heavy vehicles 
28 Jan 
2003 
Major work starts on the $680 million Cross City Tunnel. 
3 Mar 2003 RTA meets the Auditor General to explain that if the terms of the CCT had 
been made public during the negotiations of the Lane Cove Tunnel Project 
Deed, those negotiations would have been compromised (Lane Cove Tunnel 
Project was signed on 4 December 2003). 
24 June 
2003 
The first order for the production of state papers by the Legislative Council 
relating to the Cross City Tunnel. Focuses on documents relating to contract 
negotiations for the financing, construction, operation and maintenance of 
the Cross City Tunnel. Sir Laurence Street, independent Legal Arbiter, 
upholds the validity of the claim of privilege on the majority of documents 
and only a small selection of privileged documents were made public. A 
substantial volume of documents were released into the public domain 
without a claim for privilege being made. 
June 2003 Contract summary provided to the Auditor-General. 
Sept 2003 Documents relating to the Cross City Tunnel tabled in the Legislative 
Council. Documents that were considered privileged by the RTA sent to an 
Independent Arbiter to determine the validity of this claim which was 
upheld. A substantial volume of documents were released into the public 
domain without a claim for privilege being made. 
3 Dec 2003 Letter from the Minister for Roads (Mr Scully) to the Minister for 
Infrastructure, Planning and Natural Resources (Mr Knowles) regarding the 
relocation of the ventilation stack for the Cross City Tunnel expressing 
‘disappointment and concern at the fact that extracts from the draft Cabinet 
Minute on this issue have been sighted by members of the Cross City 
Motorway Consortium, with the consequence that the Government’s ability 
to secure an outcome which best protects the interest of the NSW taxpayers 
may have been compromised’. This letter was forwarded to ICAC by Mr 
Andrew Stoner MP on 3 November 2005. 
29 Feb 
2004 
‘Cross City Tunnel – Summary of Contract’ tabled in Parliament. 
21 Dec 
2004 
Treasurer (Mr Egan) approves the RTA to enter into the Cross City Tunnel 
Project First Amendment Deed with CCM under s20 of the Public 
Authorities (Financial Arrangements) Act 1987. This deed included 
provision that ‘ in consideration for the CCM’s agreement to fund and carry 
out certain [changes if required by the RTA], CCM may increase the Base 
Toll to be collected from motorists on the terms set out in the First 
Amendment Deed’. 
23 Dec 
2004 
The First Amendment Deed entered into by RTA and CCM enabling $35 
million of additional works to be paid for through a higher base toll 
(increased by $0.15). 
3 Aug 2005 Hon Joseph Tripodi replaces the Hon Carl Scully as Minister for Roads. 
28 Aug 
2005 
Cross City Tunnel opened. 
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Date Event 
13 Oct 
2005 
Papers considered privileged in June 2003 to be reassessed by Sir Laurence 
Street in view of the public interest in matters concerning the Cross City 
Tunnel. This was the first time the House had resolved that privileged 
documents be reassessed by an arbiter. The documents were tabled in the 
House in 20 October 2005. 
18 Oct 
2005 
Call for papers relating to the Cross City Tunnel produced since the original 
call for papers in June 2003. Documents tabled in the House on 18 October 
2005. 
Nov 2005 Summary of Cross City Tunnel Project Deed made public. 
4 Nov 2005 Dispute of the validity of the claim of privilege on documents received on 1 
November 2005 from the Minister for Roads, the Cabinet Office and NSW 
Treasury received by the Clerk of the Legislative Council. According to 
standing order, the documents were released to Sir Laurence Street for 
assessment. Determined that material be made public. Documents tabled on 
16 November 2005. 
December 
2005 
Cheung Kong Infrastructure, the major equity investor in the Cross City 
Tunnel project, writes down the carrying value of their investment in the 
Cross City Tunnel by A$102 million, ‘in view of lower [than] projected toll 
revenue’. 
9 Feb 2006 Announcement made that Mr Peter Sansom is to be replaced as Chief 
Executive of CrossCity Motorway by former Brisbane and Wellington ports 
chief Mr Graham Mulligan. 
17 Feb 
2006 
Hon Eric Roozendaal replaces the Hon Joseph Tripodi as Minister for Roads. 
28 Feb 
2006 
Joint Select Committee on the Cross City Tunnel tables its First Report. 
5 Mar 2006 Tunnel toll halved to $1.78 for cars and $3.56 for heavy vehicles for a period 
of at least three months. Premier (Mr Iemma) and Minister for Roads (Mr 
Roozendaal) announce that 12 category C and D road changes will be 
reversed and that negotiations with CCM will continue in relation to other 
road changes. 
April 2006 The ICAC reported on allegations of corruption in reference to the possible 
leaking a Cabinet minutes. The ICAC made no findings that any person 
engaged in corrupt conduct. 
April 2006 William Street surface works completed. 
19 Dec 
2035 
Cross City Tunnel due to be returned to public ownership.  
 
Table 1 – Chronology of key events relating to the CCT (NSW PJSC on CCT 2006)
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4.2.3 Multiple Receiverships for Cross City Tunnel (CCT) 
 
Following the opening of the tunnel in August 2005, the actual traffic volumes were 
significantly lower than the traffic volumes forecasted by the Cross City Motorway 
(CCM). This resulted in lower than expected revenue and the tunnel being placed 
into receivership on the 26
th
 December 2006 which was followed by a competitive 
tender process to sell the asset. The tunnel was formally transferred from the Cross 
City Motorway consortium to a new consortium formed by ABN AMRO and 
Leighton Contractors on the 27
th
 September 2007.  Based on Figure 9 the estimated 
road patronage at May 2006 was 34,000 while the CCM projected patronage was 
87,088 meaning the patronage was overestimated by a facture of more than 2.5. The 
Cross City Tunnel was sold for $700 million with construction costs estimated to be 
$1 billion (AAP 2007). 
 
Figure 9 – Estimated actual patronage vs  CCM’s projects (NSW A-D 2006 page 32) 
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The second financial failure occurred in September 2013 when the consortium 
comprising of the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), EISER Infrastructure Partners and 
Leighton Contractors placed the asset in receivership. This was in the wake of a legal 
dispute with the NSW government over stamp duty. 
4.2.4 Current status of the Cross City Tunnel 
  
 After negotiation with the tunnels’ receivers and managers, Transurban purchased 
the toll road for $475 million in 2014 (AAP 2014). Transurban remains the current 
owner and operator of the toll road. Traffic volumes for the second half of 2014 as 
reported by Transurban (Traffic and Revenue Data Dec 2014) were 36,630 trips. 
Traffic volumes have increased only slightly since opening and are still much less 
than the original projected patronage however based on the asset purchase price the 
toll road may become profitable.  
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4.2.5 Measurement against Proposed Framework using Appraisal Template  
 
Item Success Factors  and Sub-Success Factor Appraisal 
Criteria   
Assessment  
1 Risk allocation and sharing 
 Were the major risks allocated to the party beast able to 
manage it?  
 Did government refrain from the idea of transferring all 
project risk to the private sector?  
 Did the public partner retain risks that obviously went 
beyond the control of the private sector?  
 
The Cross City Motorway (CCM) Consortium were contracted to finance, 
build, own, operate and maintain the tunnel for the concession terms. 
Concession period was until 2035.  
 
Trustee and company accepted; 
 All risks associated with the financing, design, construction, 
operation, maintenance and repair costs of the project 
 The risks that traffic volumes or project revenues might be less than 
expected 
 Tax risks, and 
 The risks that their works or operational and maintenance activities 
might be disrupted by the lawful actions of other government and local 
government authorities or a court or tribunal. 
 
Based on the above ; 
 The risks other than the traffic volumes was allocated to the consortium 
which had the best capacity to manage them. 
 Government transferred all construction and operation risk to the 
consortium however RTA shared some of the risks associated with the 
project planning approvals and more specifically carbon monoxide 
treatment. 
 Consortium took risks on traffic volumes which as with the ED could be 
argued in beyond the control of CCM. Based on the evidence in Chapter 
4.2.3 the road patronage was over estimated meaning the government 
avoided losses in this instance. 
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Item Success Factors  and Sub-Success Factor Appraisal 
Criteria   
Assessment  
 Note that the government had ‘no net cost to government’ basis for the 
bid process for this project  
 
 
2 Strength of private consortium. 
 Was the construction company component of the consortium 
large and well established?  
 Was consortium equipped with strong technical, operational 
and managerial capacity to undertake the project?  
 Did the consortia (Private contractor concessionaire) have 
easy access to the financial market with the associated 
benefits of lower financial costs? 
 Was the winning consortium proposal a Cost effective 
technical solution? 
 
 The company who constructed the project was a Joint Venture between 
Baulderstone Hornibrook and its parent company at the time Bilfinger 
Berger. Baulderstone Hornibrook were a large well established 
Australian civil contractor who had previously completed the M5 East 
Tunnel project. Bilfinger Berger are a large multinational contractor.   
 Based on the background of the construction JV the consortium had a 
strong technical, operational and managerial capacity to complete the 
project.  
 ABN AMRO, the financing component of the consortium, is a large 
international bank with easy access to financial markets.  
 Winning consortium was a Cost effective technical solution as they won 
the tender by using a non-conforming design. As reported in the 
Auditors Generals Report the ‘Long 80’ bid clearly represents value for 
money than the proposals submitted by other Proponents. The winning 
design was longer and deeper than the other bids which meant vehicles 
could travel at 80km/h as well as minimising the disruption to William 
St.  
 
3 Political Support. 
 Did the government (previous and current) have a positive 
political attitude towards the private sector involved in the 
infrastructure project? 
 Where there existing government policy for the management 
of PPPs?  
 Had the project been part of a long term transport plan?  
 Was political backing strong and did the government at the 
 No evidence of any animosity existed between the State government and 
the consortium prior to operational stage of the PPP. Once the tunnel 
was opened the relationship deteriorated to the point where the 
Government and CCM were openly criticising each other in the media. 
(Phibbs 2007) 
 Government had promoted PPP as means of providing large 
infrastructure projects. NSW Government had  Working with 
Government Guidelines for Privately Financed Project Nov 2001 to 
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Item Success Factors  and Sub-Success Factor Appraisal 
Criteria   
Assessment  
time ‘sell’ the project?  management PPP’s  
 Tunnel was part of a long term plan, The idea of the Tunnel was first 
conceived in 1990 and in 1998 the government proposed scheme under 
‘Action for Transport 2010’ strategic plan 
 Project had been part of the Action for Transport 2010 plan and 
therefore had strong political backing which is substantiated by its 
construction. However once constructed following community backlash 
over surface road closures political backing was lost. Politicians started 
to criticise the project, the procurement process and the over optimistic 
traffic forecasts.  This was a catalyst for a number of government 
inquiries.  
 Although government avoided financial risk they were unable to absolve 
themselves form the political risk associated with the project not 
meeting expectations (Infrastructure Australia 2008 p. 15) 
 
4 Public/Community Support. 
 Project acceptance and understanding by the public 
community be it media, trade unions, non-governmental 
organisations 
 Did host government create awareness and undertake public 
education  
 Did the project have political capital?  
 Where community concerns addressed during planning and 
construction phases?  
 Was the public perception of the project positive or 
negative?  
 
 Public consultation undertaken as part of the EIS for the Cross City 
Tunnel indicated broad level of support with the broader community 
seeing the merit of removing surface traffic (PPK Environment and 
Infrastructure 2006)  
 Community consultation was undertaken under the EIS however the 
Joint Select Committee on the CCT found there was insufficient public 
interest evaluation. (Joint Select Committee on the CCT 2006a) 
 Negative public perception when the tunnel opened which was centred 
on the cost of the toll and extent and impact of the road alterations 
(Auditor General’s Report 2006 p. 27). Other issues included lack of 
community empathy, transparency, identity and a project in isolation 
(Infrastructure Implementation Group 2005) 
 Stakeholders Representations from the EIS resulted in restored access 
and restrictions to surface roads for travel travelling through 
Woolloomooloo and Kings Cross 
46 
 
Item Success Factors  and Sub-Success Factor Appraisal 
Criteria   
Assessment  
 Project had political capital prior to opening however this quickly 
dissipated once the tunnel was opened 
 
5 Transparency of Procurement. 
 Tendering process that ensured value for money through 
competitive bidding process  
 Level of communication with stakeholders  
 Public and private sections transparent and open to the 
external stakeholders 
 
 Tendering process ensured value for money as 3 Consortiums bided for 
the work.  
 Tendering completed within Working with Government Guidelines for 
Privately Financed Project Nov 2001 
 Summary of Contract provided by RTA in 2003 in accordance with 
NSW Governments November 2001 Guidelines for Private Sector 
Participation in the Provision of Public Infrastructure  
 Performance Audit Report completed by the NSW Audit Office in 2006 
to examine the processes that have been applied by the RTA to deliver 
the CCT. 
 Auditor General commented that during the financial evaluation of the 
bids the there was a large focus on the upfront fee to the government and 
that value for money for motorists (lowest toll) was of less concern. This 
evidently would have had a negative impact on the procurement process.  
 Although unsubstantiated there was a public perception that the project 
was done under a secret deal.  
 
6 Economic Viability. 
 Accuracy of the traffic volumes – Forecast versus actual  
 Effect of actual traffic volumes on financial performance, 
short term and long term 
 Forecast Traffic volumes and Financial model  
 
 
 Traffic volumes at May 2006 were 34,000 ADT compared to the 87,088 
ADT forecast.  
 Long term traffic volumes were overestimated with traffic volumes in 
the last quarter of 2014 being 36,660 trips. Effect on financial 
performance is two operators have gone into receivership and the asset 
value has dropped from $1 billion to $475 million.  
 Initial financial model was totally dependent on traffic volumes. 
Transurban can potentially make the toll road profitable as they 
purchased the tunnel for $475 million.  
 Note that although the tunnel operators encountered financial stress due 
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Item Success Factors  and Sub-Success Factor Appraisal 
Criteria   
Assessment  
to low the traffic volumes the tunnel continued to operate. 
7 Environmental outcomes. 
 Reduction in traffic congestion  
 Reduced air and noise pollution  
 Removal of traffic from local streets 
 Improvement of visual and environmental amenity  
 
 
 As detailed in the RTA Summary of Contract (2008) the Primary 
objective of the tunnel was to reduce through traffic in central Sydney. 
Benefits were expected to be; 
o Improved travel time and service reliability for buses in the 
CBD 
o Better access and movement in the city for pedestrians, cyclists, 
taxis and delivery vehicles  
o Safer and more pleasant street environments for pedestrians, 
residents, workers and businesses  
o Better air quality in the city 
o Improved travel times for east west through traffic  
 As the traffic volumes remain low the extent of traffic removed from the 
CBD is not as high as anticipated. The magnitude of the benefits is 
therefore debatable.  
8 Economic contribution to the cities/regions in which 
they are constructed. 
 More efficient movement of freight resulting in economic 
benefits  
 Improvement to service delivery to the business districts 
along the corridor 
 General reduction in travel times for road users resulting 
greater efficiency 
 
 Monetarised cost benefit ratio (BCR) for the Cross City Tunnel as 
documented in the EIS is 3.4:1. (RTA 2010)  
 Reduced traffic volumes in the CBD would ultimately improve service 
delivery to businesses and reduce travel times however as stated above 
as the traffic volumes removed from the CBD are lower than predicted 
the magnitude in improvement is debatable.  
9 Additional factors identified during research 
 
 
 
 
No additional factors of significance identified. 
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4.2.6 Conclusion  
 
The Cross City Tunnel project delivered a world class piece of infrastructure at no 
net cost to the taxpayer. It is also likely that the adopted PPP model allowed the 
project to be supplied far earlier than would have been possible using Government 
funded models.  
When measured against the proposed framework, the project only performed well 
against the strength of the private consortium criteria. However even the merit of this 
criteria was debatable as the risk allocation and erroneous traffic projections resulted 
in the project being placed in receivership within two years of opening. The 
consortium delivered a high quality asset in good time and ultimately at a very cheap 
price however their failure to adequately predict the traffic volumes was a significant 
failure.  
Although the tunnel resulted in positive environmental outcomes as well as economic 
contributions, the magnitude of these criteria is significantly impacted by the reduced 
traffic volumes. Obviously the tunnel has resulted in reduced traffic volumes through 
the city, however as they are less than half of the projected volumes, the traffic 
reductions and economic benefits would not be as high as originally thought.  
The project had strong political and community support up to the opening of the 
tunnel however once opened the Cross City Tunnel was greeted with significant 
controversy resulting in the State Government receiving strong criticism from the 
public and the media. This saw political support for the project evaporate.  The 
Infrastructure Implementation Group (2005) identified public/community issues as 
being; 
 Transparency – Although massive amounts of public documentation was 
available there was a perception that there was no transparency. This was due 
to the lack if interaction with users which was needed in addition to the 
consultation with the local communities. Public communication should have 
been stronger and ongoing after planning approval.  
 The Toll – CCT was singled out although motorists paid higher tolls in higher 
numbers every day. This was identified a as complex issue which related to 
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identity, perceived value for money, transparency and a community toll 
threshold that few people recognised.  
 Identity – CCT had an identity crisis as it was perceived as not having a 
destination as well as denying existing access to important destinations 
 Community Empathy – CCT was the first toll road with full electronic tolling 
which created community issues which the operator did not expect.  
 Project In Isolation – CCT was not perceived as part of the wider Sydney 
motorway network.   
It should be also be noted that Auditors General Performance Audit (2006 p. 7) 
indicated there was a widely held view that the road changes were not necessary and 
were introduced to force people into the tunnel to profit the operator. The Audit 
however found no evidence of this and the objective of the road changes were to 
reduce the through traffic in and around Central Sydney and improve the public 
domain. This finding confirms that the community consultation failed to identify and 
communicate to prevent resentment towards the road changes.  
The other significant failing of the project was its economic viability which was a 
result of the inaccurate traffic projections and was compounded by the public 
backlash against the road changes. As shown in figure 9 the actual estimated 
patronage did not reach the projected patronage during the toll free period indicating 
the original feasibility study was flawed.  During the bidding process there was a 
significant difference between the three consortiums patronage projections. The 
Auditor General considered that the assessment panel should have more robustly 
challenged all bidders (Infrastructure Australia 2008). One of the lessons learnt from 
this, as identified by Infrastructure Australia (2008, p. 18), is that the assessment of 
project bids must identify key assumptions which the success of a project depends 
upon and that these critical assumptions should be subject to independent evaluation.  
The procurement of the consortium for this project was transparent, however one of 
the criticisms of the procurement process by the Auditor General was that, during the 
financial evaluation of the bids, there was a large focus on the upfront fee to the 
government and that value for money for motorists (lowest toll) was of less concern.  
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4.3 Westlink M7 (Sydney) 
 
4.3.1 Introduction  
 
The West Link M7 is a 40 kilometre long motorway located in Western Sydney. It 
links the M2, M4 and M5 motorways and forms a critical part of the Sydney Orbital 
freeway and motorway system. The toll road has a fully electronic, distance based 
tolling system. The motorway replaced the Cumberland Highway as the Auslink 
National Transport Link through Sydney and allowed motorists to avoid 58 sets of 
traffic lights. The alignment of the Westlink M7 is shown in figure 10.  
Construction for the motorway commenced in July 2003 with the tollway opening on 
the 16
th
 December 2005 which was 8 months ahead of schedule. It is considered to 
be a highly successful example of a true PPP (Infrastructure Australia 2008 p. 27). 
 
Figure 10 – Westlink M7 alignment (Source: RTA Summary of Contracts 2003) 
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4.3.2 Background  
 
The concept of what would become the Westlink M7 has a long history, with the 
idea of north-south freeway in Sydney’s West being first raised in the 1960s. In 
1974, the Sydney Area Transportation Study proposed the need for an outer-
metropolitan highway and identified a corridor for its route. In 1993, the Liverpool to 
Hornsby Study Final Route identified a preferred route to connect the M5 to the M1 
(Infrastructure Australia 2008). 
In 1994 it was recognised by the Commonwealth Government that a motorway 
linking the M5, M4 and the M2 would improve the National Highway freight route. 
In late 1994 the Commonwealth Government announced a feasibility study to look at 
three routes with the final presented route being broadly similar to the Westlink M7. 
This was followed in 1996 by the Commonwealth providing funding for 
preconstruction activities and the preparation of EISs (RTA 2010 p. 8).  
In 1998 extensive community consultations were undertaken on the Western 
Sydney’s Orbital (later became Westlink M7) preliminary design and features in the 
suburbs were the motorway was to be located. The consultation process resulted in 
changing the route to a more easterly direction through Cecil Park and moving the 
alignment at Prestons Road to reduce the impact on endangered ecological 
communities (RTA 2010 p. 9). 
Although initially envisaged as a toll free road the possibility of the route being 
tolled was first raised by the Commonwealth Government in 1998 as it could not 
fund the road in the short to medium term (Infrastructure Australia 2008 p. 29).  
An Environmental Impact Statement for the M7 was publicly exhibited by the RTA 
in 2001 with two hundred and sixty seven submissions being received in response to 
the EIS. Consideration of the submissions resulted in 23 modifications to the 
proposal. Planning approval for the motorway was granted on the 28
th
 February 2002 
(RTA 2010, p. 9). 
In July 2001 the RTA invited Registrations for Interest from private sector parties for 
the finance, design, construction, operation and maintenance of the Western Sydney 
Orbital. Three consortia were selected by the closing date of 29 August 2001:  
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 The Westlink Motorway consortium, sponsored by Leighton Contractors, 
Abigroup, Transurban and Macquarie Bank.  
 The Orbital Alliance consortium, sponsored by Theiss, Baulderstone 
Hornibrook, CKI and Deutsche Bank.  
 The Western Link Joint Venture consortium, sponsored by Transfield and 
Bouygues Travaux.  
The three consortiums developed detailed proposals which were submitted on the 
19
th
 March 2002. A detailed evaluation process was undertaken by the Evaluation 
Committee which consisted of various representatives from State Treasury, RTA and 
a procurement consultant. On the 28
th
 October 2002 the Westlink Motorway 
consortium were announced as the preferred proponent to operate and maintain the 
motorway for a period of 34 years. The execution of the principal contacts for the 
project occurred on the 13
th
 February 2003, with major construction starting in July 
2003 (RTA 2010, p. 12).  
 
At the time of opening, the equity investors in the consortium were Transurban 
Limited 40%, Macquarie Infrastructure Group 40%, Leighton Holdings and 
Contractors 10% and Abigroup Limited 10%.   
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4.3.3 The Current Status of the Westlink M7 
 
Westlink Motorway Limited continues to own and operate the Westlink M7. The 
current equity investors in the consortium are Transurban 50%, Queensland 
Investment Corporation 25%, and Canada Pension Plan Investment Board 25%.  
The traffic volumes of the M7 were approximately 52 percent below forecasts within 
first year of operation however fortunately toll revenue forecasts were better than 
traffic forecasts. This was due to the compensating errors in trip lengths. In recent 
years motorway traffic has shown strong growth with the southern section of the road 
reflecting a high level of industrial development. (Department of Infrastructure and 
Growth 2011, p. 22). Traffic volumes have increased 160% since opening as shown 
in figure 11.  
 
Figure 11 – Westlink Rolling 12 Month ADT 2006 to 2014 (ChartingTransport.com 2014) 
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4.3.4 Measurement against Proposed Framework using Appraisal Template 
 
Item Success Factors  and Sub-Success Factor Appraisal 
Criteria   
Assessment  
1 Risk allocation and sharing 
 Were the major risks allocated to the party beast able to 
manage it?  
 Did government refrain from the idea of transferring all 
project risk to the private sector?  
 Did the public partner retain risks that obviously went 
beyond the control of the private sector?  
 
Based on the Infrastructure Australia Report (2008)  
 Private Sector Consortium accepted majority of the risk including 
construction costs, traffic volumes or projected revenue below 
expectations, traffic management during construction, tax, lawful 
disruptions by other government authorities impacting on works, 
operation and maintenance activities  
 Risks were allocated to the parties best able to manage as even the 
traffic volumes were developed and tested by the consortium. The RTA 
made no representations or promises regarding traffic volumes.  
 The RTA did refrain from transferring risk that went beyond the 
consortiums control. For example the RTA would pay for any costs 
associated amendments or changes to planning approval which were not 
a result of a breach by Westlink M7. In addition RTA would pay 
reasonable costs to Westlink M7 should a legal challenge to the RTA 
halt works   
2 Strength of private consortium. 
 Was the construction company component of the consortium 
large and well established?  
 Was consortium equipped with strong technical, operational 
and managerial capacity to undertake the project?  
 Did the consortia (Private contractor concessionaire) have 
easy access to the financial market with the associated 
benefits of lower financial costs? 
 Was the winning consortium proposal a Cost effective 
technical solution? 
 
 The Westlink consortium at the time of delivery consisted of 
Transurban, Macquarie infrastructure Group (MIG), Leighton Holdings, 
Leighton Contractors and Abigroup Limited 
 The construction company component, Leighton Contractors and 
Abigroup were large well established companies. Leighton Contractors 
are still one the most experienced project development and construction 
companies in Australia. Abigroup were also a well-established road 
construction contractor with extensive experience in delivery of large 
scale road projects.  
 Transurban and MIG at the time of delivery were both one the world’s 
largest toll road owners and managers. MIG was managed by the 
Infrastructure and Specialised Funds division of Macquarie Bank and as 
55 
 
Item Success Factors  and Sub-Success Factor Appraisal 
Criteria   
Assessment  
such had easy access to the Financial Market.  
 Based on the RTA assessment criteria, which did not just look at the 
price but also ‘non price assessment’ including the design and construct 
component, it can perceived that the winning consortium was a cost 
effective technical solution. In addition the RTA Summary of 
Contracted (2003) that the Westlink proposal represented better value 
for money than the other alternatives.   
3 Political Support. 
 Did the government (previous and current) have a positive 
political attitude towards the private sector involved in the 
infrastructure project? 
 Where there existing government policy for the management 
of PPPs?  
 Had the project been part of a long term transport plan?  
 Was political backing strong and did the government at the 
time ‘sell’ the project?  
 No evidence of any negative political attitude towards the private sector 
involved in the project.  
 NSW Government had Working with Government Guidelines for 
Privately Financed Project Nov 2001 to manage PPP’s  
 The M7 route formed part of the National Highway System and as such 
required funding by the Commonwealth. Federal Government instigated 
the PPP as originally the road was to be toll free however in 1998 as the 
Federal Government could not fund the road in the short to medium 
term. 
 The concept of a north-south freeway-standard link in Western Sydney 
was first proposed by the NSW Department of Main Roads in the 
1960s. The need for an orbital connection was then identified in ‘The 
Sydney Area Transportation Plan 1974’ followed by ‘The Liverpool to 
Hornsby Strategy Final Route 1993, and then the proposed ‘Action for 
Sydney 2010’. The project had therefore been planned for over forty 
years.  
 Toll road had strong political backing from both State and Federal 
Government. The M7 formed part of the NSW governments ‘Action for 
Transport 2010’. The Federal Government provided funding for the 
initial feasibility studies and instigated the PPP when they realised they 
couldn’t fund the project in the ‘short to medium term’.  
4 Public/Community Support. 
 Project acceptance and understanding by the public 
 As detailed in the Infrastructure Partnerships Australia (2010) Case 
Study on the M7 the ‘road had been comprehensively hailed by all 
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Item Success Factors  and Sub-Success Factor Appraisal 
Criteria   
Assessment  
community be it media, trade unions, non-governmental 
organisations 
 Did host government create awareness and undertake public 
education  
 Did the project have political capital?  
 Where community concerns addressed during planning and 
construction phases?  
 Was the public perception of the project positive or negative?  
 
stakeholders as great achievement that delivers significant benefits to 
the community’. 
 As stated by Infrastructure Australia (2008) responsiveness and 
successful community relations was a hallmark of the Westlink M7 
project.  
 Project had strong political capital with both the NSW Premier Morris 
Iemma and the Prime Minister. John Howard both attending the toll 
road opening. 
 Community concerns were addressed during the process, this resulted in 
changing the route to a more easterly direction through Cecil Park and 
moving the alignment at Prestons Road to reduce the impact on 
endangered ecological communities. 
 Westlink M7 commissioned the market research firm UMR to 
undertake a perception study 6 months after opening. 47% of 
respondent had a positive opinion of the M7, 28% somewhat positive. 
Based on the study and the overall lack of negative publicity it can be 
perceived the overall public perception the project was positive.    
5 Transparency of Procurement. 
 Tendering process that ensured value for money through 
competitive bidding process  
 Level of communication with stakeholders  
 Public and private sections transparent and open to the 
external stakeholders 
 
 Tendering process ensured value for money as three Consortiums bided 
for the work.  
 Tendering completed within Working with Government Guidelines for 
Privately Financed Project Nov 2001 
 Summary of Contract provided by RTA in 2003 in accordance with 
NSW Governments November 2001 Guidelines for Private Sector 
Participation in the Provision of Public Infrastructure  
 Summary of Contracts does not disclose the private sector parties cost 
structures, profit margins, intellectual property or any other matters 
which may impact on their competitiveness with their competitors.  
 In addition another report titled Post Implementation Review M7 
Motorway, Cross City Tunnel and Lane Cove Tunnel (March 2010) was 
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Item Success Factors  and Sub-Success Factor Appraisal 
Criteria   
Assessment  
completed by the RTA which was required under the NSW 
Governments Working with Government Guidelines, December 2006. 
The purpose of the review was to assist in refining the processes used in 
developing private sector motorway projects in the future.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 Economic Viability. 
 Accuracy of the traffic volumes – Forecast versus actual  
 Effect of actual traffic volumes on financial performance, 
short term and long term 
 Forecast Traffic volumes and Financial model  
 
 At the time of opening in 2006 initial traffic volumes were lower than 
forecasted. Actual 94,808 ADT, Projected 196,500 ADT (Black 2014) 
 Traffic Volumes Q2 2014 were 154,000 (ChartingTransport.com) 
 The project has been commercially successful, as highlighted in 
operator Transurban’s 2011 Investor Roadshow Presentation 
 Figure 11 shows a growth of 160% since 2006 which is also confirmed 
by Department of Infrastructure and Growth (2011) who also reported a 
strong growth. 
 Even though tolls were lower, toll revenue forecasts were better than 
traffic forecasts. This was due to the compensating errors in trip lengths. 
 Financial model was dependent on the traffic volumes however it was 
also dependent on the trip lengths  
7 Environmental outcomes. 
 Reduction in traffic congestion  
 Reduced air and noise pollution  
 Removal of traffic from local streets 
 Improvement of visual and environmental amenity  
 
 
 Infrastructure Australia (2008) identified some of the key 
environmental outcomes as being;  
o Reduced number of heavy vehicles using local roads, resulting 
in better air quality and less noise in residential areas. 
o Improved travel efficiency also improves air quality by 
reducing the interrupted progress that heavy vehicles 
experienced when using the Cumberland Highway  
o Extensive use of noise mounds and noise walls along the 
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Item Success Factors  and Sub-Success Factor Appraisal 
Criteria   
Assessment  
corridor. 
 
8 Economic contribution to the cities/regions in which 
they are constructed. 
 More efficient movement of freight resulting in economic 
benefits  
 Improvement to service delivery to the business districts 
along the corridor 
 General reduction in travel times for road users resulting 
greater efficiency 
 
 Benefit: cost ratio was identified by the RTA (2003) and calculated to 
be between 2.7 and 5.1 as a ratio of the benefits versus the design and 
contract costs plus the operation and maintenance costs 
 Infrastructure Partnerships Australia (2010) have also identified the 
following economic benefits; 
o Increased efficiency to freight and distribution industries with 
major businesses (Woolworths, Coles, TNT) relocating their 
logistics centres to business parks near the motorway   
o CB Richards Industrial Research concluded the M7 was 
responsible for a huge surge in the industrial development in 
Sydney  
 
 
 
9 Additional factors identified during research 
 
 Extensive Market Research   
o Identification of the needs of the toll road users  
 
 
 
 
 
 Infrastructure Australia (2008) reported that one of the lessons learnt 
was that extensive market research was important to help sell the 
project to the client base. The research ensured the pricing strategy 
suited expected use patterns. The use of the distance based toll system 
met the needs of the road operator and was also considered ‘fair’ by the 
patrons using the toll road.  
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4.3.5 Conclusion  
 
The Westlink M7 is a highly successful PPP toll road. Its success is a result of 
thorough and comprehensive planning, extensive community consultation and 
market research. In addition the toll road is successful from a design and engineering 
perspective. When compared against the appraisal model the project performed well 
against all criteria and the appraisal was also able to identify market research as an 
additional success factor.  
Specifically risk allocation and sharing was effectively transferred to the consortium 
which, as result of the strengths this party was best suited to manage. The critical risk 
of patronage forecasting was mitigated through the consortium independently 
establishing the anticipated volumes. Although the initial patronage volumes did not 
match the projected volumes the toll road was still economically viable due to a 
higher than expected proportion of short trips (Department of Infrastructure and 
Transport 2011 p.23).  
A strong level of political support was provided to the project at Federal, State and 
Local Government Levels. In addition strong public support was encountered as a 
result of the responsive and successful community relations. Extensive market 
research resulted in the consortium being able to sell the project to the client base as 
well as ensuring the pricing strategy suited their expectations. In addition the 
distance based toll system was also considered ‘fair’ by the road users (Infrastructure 
Australia 2008). 
The completed toll road resulted in reduced traffic volumes on local roads as well as 
the Cumberland Highway and therefore reduced air pollution and noise in populated 
areas of Western Sydney. In addition Western Sydney has received significant 
economic benefits as result of large companies basing their operations near the road 
corridor along with increased residential development.  
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4.4 Go-Between Bridge (Brisbane) 
 
4.4.1 Introduction and Background 
 
The Go-Between Bridge (formerly the Hale Street Link) is a four-lane tolled bridge 
for vehicles, pedestrians and cyclists across the Brisbane River. The bridge provides 
a link between Brisbane’s inner northern, western and southern suburbs. It connects 
Coronation Drive and Hale Street in Milton to Montague Road, Merivale and 
Cordelia Streets in South Brisbane.  
Construction of the project commenced in 2008 and the Bridge was opened to traffic 
on the 5
th
 of July 2010. The bridge formed a key part of Brisbane City Council’s 
long-term plan to improve cross-city travel and tackle congestion. It was the third in 
a series of TransApex projects planned to accommodate Brisbane’s growth. Unlike 
the two other projects, Clem7 tunnel and Airport Link, the Go-Between Bridge was 
financed by the government rather than private industry (Department of 
Infrastructure and Planning 2011, p. 24). The project was delivered under the 
‘Government, Builds, Tolls then Sells’ (GBTS) model. Under this model the asset is 
sold once in operation when the actual patronage volumes are known.  
The contract to design, build and maintain the infrastructure was awarded to the Hale 
Street Link Alliance which consisted of Seymour White, Macmahon Constructions, 
Bouygues Travaux Publics and Hyder Consulting. Construction was completed in 
July 2008 for a cost of $338 million.  
4.4.3 Hale Street Link – A New PPP Model  
 
A direct response to the change in investor appetite for traffic risk has been the 
emergence of the ‘Government Builds, Tolls then Sells’ (GBTS) model. Under this 
model, government engages private sector contractors to design, build and maintain 
the road and install tolling equipment, under public funded contracts. The 
government then retains the tolls during the ramp-up stage as the projects develops 
some patronage data. Once the traffic volumes are known the government then sells 
the right to levy and collect future tolls to the private sector.  The GBTS model was 
applied to the Go-Between Bridge which was sold to Queensland Motorways (now 
Transurban Queensland) in December 2013 (Hayford 2014).  
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4.4.4 The Current Status of the Go-Between Bridge  
 
The Go-Between Bridge was sold by the Brisbane City Council to Queensland 
Motorways in December 2013 with Queensland Motorway being bought by 
Transurban in 2014, who is now called Transurban Queensland.  
The actual traffic patronage in 2010 was reported to be close to forecasts, with 
around 11,700 vehicles by September 2010 compared to forecast 12,800 for October 
2010. However the comparison is invalid as the early toll was $1.50 instead of the 
$2.70 used in the forecast. Revenue forecasts were over optimistic. The current toll is 
$3.02 for a standard vehicle and the patronage in 2014 was 14,000 to 15,000 vehicles 
a day (Passmore 2014).  
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4.4.5 Measurement against Proposed Framework using Appraisal Template 
 
Item Success Factors  and Sub-Success Factor Appraisal 
Criteria   
Assessment  
1 Risk allocation and sharing 
 Were the major risks allocated to the party beast able to 
manage it?  
 Did government refrain from the idea of transferring all 
project risk to the private sector?  
 Did the public partner retain risks that obviously went 
beyond the control of the private sector?  
 
 Major risk were transferred to the parties best able to manage them as 
the “Government Builds, Tolls then Sells” (GBTS) model was used. As 
the construction of the project was completed under an ‘alliance’ 
Brisbane City Council (BCC) would have taken on some of the 
construction risk which may have resulted in savings. BCC took the risk 
on the traffic patronage.  
 As the GBTS model was used the government (BCC) refrained from 
transferring all risk to the private sector and as such the public partner 
retained the risk that went beyond the control of the private sector being 
the road patronage. As the construction component of the project was 
completed as an alliance BCC retained some of the risk. 
2 Strength of private consortium. 
 Was the construction company component of the consortium 
large and well established?  
 Was consortium equipped with strong technical, operational 
and managerial capacity to undertake the project?  
 Did the consortia (Private contractor concessionaire) have 
easy access to the financial market with the associated 
benefits of lower financial costs? 
 Was the winning consortium proposal a Cost effective 
technical solution? 
 
 The ‘construction company’ consisted of an alliance between Seymour 
White, Macmahon Constructions, Bouygues Travaux Publics and Hyder 
Consulting and Brisbane City Council. 
 The construction alliance consisted of a local contractor (Seymour 
Whyte), a national contractor (Macmahon), a large multinational 
contractor (Bouygues) and a large international designer (Hyder), this 
resulted in strong ‘construction company’ that had the advantage of 
local, national and international knowledge which can therefore be 
perceived as having strong  technical, operational and managerial 
capacity.  
 The Project was initially funded by the Brisbane City Council however 
the toll road is now owned by Transurban which is one of the largest toll 
road owners and operators in the world and has great financial strength. 
 GHD was engaged by the Brisbane City Council to complete a 
feasibility study and impact assessment study of the proposed Hale 
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Item Success Factors  and Sub-Success Factor Appraisal 
Criteria   
Assessment  
Street link. GHD looked at a variety of options with the preferred option 
being a segmentally launched concrete box girder bridge. Based on the 
feasibility process it appears the final design represented a cost effective 
technical solution.  
3 Political Support. 
 Did the government (previous and current) have a positive 
political attitude towards the private sector involved in the 
infrastructure project? 
 Where there existing government policy for the management 
of PPPs?  
 Had the project been part of a long term transport plan?  
 Was political backing strong and did the government at the 
time ‘sell’ the project?  
 No evidence exists of any negative political attitude towards the private 
sector involved in the project.  
 Project formed part of the Brisbane City Council TransApex plan which 
was a long term transport plan first proposed by future premier 
Campbell Newman at the 2004 election. 
 No specific government policy was identified for the Brisbane City 
Council to manage PPPs.  
 Campbell Newman (when Major) was known at the time of delivery as 
‘can do Campbell’ and had successfully championed the construction of 
the North South Bypass Tunnel (Clem7). This meant the project had 
strong political backing from the mayor at the time.  
 Due to the significant community and press opposition to the proposed 
bridge, significant effort was put into winning community support. 
(Department of Infrastructure and Transport 2011p. 26) 
4 Public/Community Support. 
 Project acceptance and understanding by the public 
community be it media, trade unions, non-governmental 
organisations 
 Did host government create awareness and undertake public 
education  
 Did the project have political capital?  
 Where community concerns addressed during planning and 
construction phases?  
 Was the public perception of the project positive or 
negative?  
 
 As stated above, there was significant community and press and 
opposition to the project. Considerable effort was made to win 
community support, this included naming the bridge after the famous 
indie rock band The Go-Betweens, having a charity concert with 
members of the band, having a community open day at opening and 
making cycle and walking lanes free 
 Due to the concerns of the community and the negative press which 
existed,  the project had little political capital. 
 Community concerns were addressed, A feasibility study to assess the 
project commenced in July 2005. Crucial to Council’s evaluation was a 
voluntary Impact Assessment Statement (IAS) and Business Case that 
included comprehensive stakeholder community engagement and 
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Item Success Factors  and Sub-Success Factor Appraisal 
Criteria   
Assessment  
consultation. After 15 months of consultation and issues management an 
unprecedented 9,000 submissions were made by stakeholders.  
 Public perception was generally positive with widespread support from 
the greater Brisbane community however opponents to the Link were 
vocal and well organised. 
5 Transparency of Procurement. 
 Tendering process that ensured value for money through 
competitive bidding process  
 Level of communication with stakeholders  
 Public and private sections transparent and open to the 
external stakeholders 
 
 The initial feasibility study to find the most efficient concept design 
followed by the tender process ensured value for money in terms of 
delivering the asset for operation.  
 Generally not a high level of transparency in the procurement process 
existed however cost increases have been widely reported with the 
estimated cost being $307 million in 2008 however the project’s final 
cost was $338 million which was a result of a via-duct having to be 
constructed on the Coronation drive side. 
 
6 Economic Viability. 
 Accuracy of the traffic volumes – Forecast versus actual  
 Effect of actual traffic volumes on financial performance, 
short term and long term 
 Forecast Traffic volumes and Financial model  
 
 The actual traffic forecast in 2010 was reported to be  close to forecasts, 
with around 11,700 vehicles by September 2010 compared to forecast 
12,800 for October 2010. Patronage in 2014 was 14,000 to 15,000 
vehicles a day. 
 “Government Builds, Tolls then Sells” (GBTS) model was used. The 
government’s main priority was to provide infrastructure and not so 
much the financial return. The actual traffic volumes did not have as 
much of a significant effect on BCC as they would have had on a 
consortium using a ‘Build Own Operate Transfer’ (BOOT) PPP Model.  
 The reduced traffic volumes meant BCC was not recovering there costs.  
As the bridge was sold to Transurban BCC have received market value 
for the bridge in terms of how much revenue it can generate. BCCs true 
cost for the bridge is the construction cost less the sale cost. Therefore 
BCC have ended up with valuable piece of infrastructure at a fraction of 
the cost.   
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Item Success Factors  and Sub-Success Factor Appraisal 
Criteria   
Assessment  
7 Environmental outcomes. 
 Reduction in traffic congestion  
 Reduced air and noise pollution  
 Removal of traffic from local streets 
 Improvement of visual and environmental amenity  
 
 
 Toll Road formed part of the TransApex plan whose main objective was 
to relieve congestion in Brisbane.  
BCC website claims the Go-Between Bridge would; 
 Improves cross river accessibility  
 Reduce Congestion  
 Opens up extra networks for pedestrian and cyclists  
 Provide additional relief in the event of an accident elsewhere in the city 
 Cater for future population growth in Wet End and South Brisbane 
8 Economic contribution to the cities/regions in which 
they are constructed. 
 More efficient movement of freight resulting in economic 
benefits  
 Improvement to service delivery to the business districts 
along the corridor 
 General reduction in travel times for road users resulting 
greater efficiency 
 
 The cost benefit analysis which formed part of the Business case for the 
project detailed project costs over a thirty year period as detailed by 
Kraatz (2009) and claimed the following:  
 
The HSL is economically positive for both the base case and a number of 
additional sensitivities. These additional sensitivities included increasing the 
discount rate and construction costs. Additionally, the economic assessment 
found that:  
- Approximately 65% of the benefits arise from travel time savings; 
- Approximately 24% of benefits arise from vehicle operating cost 
savings; and  
- Approximately 10% of benefits arise from a reduction in vehicle 
emissions.  
 
9 Additional factors identified during research 
 
 
No additional factors of significance identified. 
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4.4.6 Conclusion  
 
The Go–Between Bridge provided the first river crossing over the Brisbane River in 
40 years with debate still continuing whether it should be considered a success.  
When the project is measured against the frame work it is more successful than 
unsuccessful.  
The risk allocation and construction component of the toll road can be classed as 
successful as the delivery resulted in world class piece of infrastructure and the use 
of the GBTS PPP model was a smart response to the challenges of the project. 
Political support was mixed however the ‘can do’ Major, Campbell Newman 
championed the project and ensured its delivery.  
Public community support was mixed however the patronage numbers now appear to 
be close to forecast which generally shows a high level of support as the community 
has not ‘boycotted’ the bridge. There appeared not to be a high level of Transparency 
of procurement as there was not the same level of reporting provided for road 
projects in New South Wales.  
The economic viability was the most contentious issue however this is debatable as it 
really is a question of what the function of government is. A Brisbane City Council 
representative stated that the economic viability was not the priority of the toll way 
and this is substantiated by the adoption of the GBTS model. As the toll way has now 
been sold to Transurban BCC have received market value for the asset and even if 
this is less than the actual cost they are still in a better financial positon than had they 
built the bridge and not tolled it.  
Economic contribution is difficult to quantify however the bridge would have some 
effect on traffic congestion and travel times and therefore would be making a 
positive economic contribution.  
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Chapter 5 - Framework Validation  
 
 
The case studies were used to test the appropriateness of the nominated factors to 
enable project success. Although specific results were recorded against each of the 
factors, the overall perception of success within society also had to be gauged.  
The Eastern Distributor and Westlink M7 toll roads are perceived as successful. The 
success of the M7 project is substantiated by the Infrastructure Australia (2008) 
report that stated that it considered the project a highly successful example of a true 
PPP. The Eastern Distributor’s level of accomplishment is supported by Warren 
(2007) who proposed that the Eastern Distributor was successful, this was also 
supported by the Infrastructure Implementation Group (2005) who reported that the 
project was a relative success.  
The Cross City Tunnel is classed as a failed PPP. Ferguson (2009) refers to the 
project as a disaster although this was more from the perspective of an investor, 
while Phibbs labelled the project as a ‘fairly spectacular failure as a Public Private 
Partnership’. In addition the Second Audit Report undertaken by the NSW State 
Government was completed to address the public mistrust in private involvement in 
the provision of infrastructure. This provided additional support to the notion that the 
Cross City Tunnel was a debacle.  
While the classification of the abovementioned three case studies is clear, the Go-
Between Bridge is ambiguous. Based on the evidence encountered in the case study 
review the project could be deemed as a success, however literature does not provide 
a clear statement to substantiate this theory. As a result for validation purposes this 
toll road will be overall classified as neutral.   
 
 
 
 
 
68 
 
 
 
A summary of the case study outcomes based on the Appraisal Criteria is provided in 
Table 2. The summary details whether each of success factors were adequately 
addressed in the case study projects.  
 
 Success Factor Status from Case Study 
Ite
m  
Success Factor  Eastern 
Distributor 
Cross 
City 
Tunnel 
Westlink 
M7 
Go-
Between 
Bridge 
1 Risk Allocation and 
Sharing 
    
2 Strength of private 
consortium 
 
 
   
3 Political Support     
4 Public/Community 
Support 
    
5 Transparency of 
Procurement 
    
6 Economic Viability     
7 Environmental factors     
8 Economic contribution     
9 Additional factors     
      Success Factor was evident        Success Factor was not evident  
 
     Success Factor marginally evident  
   
Table 2 – Case Study Success Factors Status Summary  
 
The framework is validated by the results of the case studies and is consistent with 
the perceived level of success of the subject projects. The case studies of the Eastern 
Distributor and the Westlink M7 had eight contributing success factors and are 
perceived to be successful. The Cross City Tunnel did not possess four of the eight 
factors and is widely regarded as an unsuccessful PPP. While the Go-Between 
Bridge was neutral on two of the factors and as a result incurs ongoing debate on its 
success.  
In addition, the framework provides a gauge of how balanced a project is when 
considered in terms of equilibrium-where the requirements of society are considered 
as a whole. The inclusion of the Environmental Outcomes criteria provides an 
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opportunity to measure how the toll road impacted on the surrounding environments. 
This was one the strongest attributes of the Eastern Distributors and Cross City 
Tunnel which justifies its inclusion in the framework.  
Economic Contribution was also required to provide a holistic framework and the 
results of the case studies substantiate its inclusion. This was also one of the most 
successful outcomes of the Westlink M7 and was also significant for the Eastern 
Distributor. The results of the case studies, and the fact that the increase of economic 
performance is one of the main drivers for road infrastructure, confirms the inclusion 
of Economic Contribution in the framework.  
The framework is also consistent with the Equilibrium Framework proposed by 
Garvin (2007). Garvin’s concept proposed that for a PPP project to be overall 
successful the competing interests of participants must reach an overall balance. The 
overall successful projects could be said to be located within Garvin’s range of 
balance within his P3 equilibrium framework. For example the Eastern Distributor’s 
high rate of return was in the interest of industry. The fact that all the risk was taken 
on by the consortium was in the interest of the state while the strong environmental 
outcomes and economic contribution was in the interest of society. This overall 
resulted in a relatively balanced programme. The Cross City Tunnel however was 
outside the range of balance as the risk allocation, combined with the lack of 
economic viability, meant the interests of the state were too arduous which resulted 
in a bias. In addition it was perceived by the community that road closures forcing 
motorist to use the toll road were in the interest of the private consortium (industry). 
NSW parliamentary enquiry however concluded that this was unfounded.  
In conclusion the significance of the factors selected on the overall performance of 
the case studies justifies their selection and therefore validates the framework. The 
selected success factors provide a holistic appraisal structure which is consistent with 
Garvin’s equilibrium framework.    
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Chapter 6 – Results and Discussion 
 
6.1 – Case Study Results 
 
The case studies provided clear evidence that consideration of all the success factors 
does lead to a successful Public Private Partnership. It was apparent that the Eastern 
Distributor and the Westlink M7 toll roads had adequately addressed all of the 
success factors. They had a high level of achievement in terms of being financially 
viable along with meeting their main objective of servicing society. In addition, 
marketing was identified as an extra success factor that was critical to the toll road 
meeting the requirements of the road users. The Cross City Tunnel Project did not 
have the success factors of Political Support; Public/Community Support, 
Transparency of Procurement and Economic Viability and has struggled to be viable 
to this day.  
 
Risk allocation and sharing was evident in all of the case studies as this is one of the 
main components of the PPP delivery model. As discussed in the background and 
literature review chapter, governments are attracted to the PPP the model by the 
belief that the risks are allocated to the parties best able to manage them. From the 
evidence of the case studies this is generally supported. The risks associated with 
project delivery such construction risk are definitely managed more effectively by 
the construction consortiums than with government. From a delivery point of view 
all the case study projects were finished well ahead of programme with no major 
engineering issues. However when it came to the risks associated with traffic 
patronage it is debatable whether the consortiums were the best parties to manage 
this aspect. The Eastern Distributor and Cross City Tunnel case studies demonstrate 
the two extremes of what the can be the outcome of taking on the traffic patronage 
risk. The Cross City Tunnel was a failure due to the actual traffic volumes being less 
than forecast which resulted in the toll road going into receivership. The Eastern 
Distributor predicted traffic volumes appeared to have been under estimated which 
resulted in huge returns (45% IRR) for the consortium, however this meant the users 
were not really receiving value for money as the tolls could have been lower. If the 
government takes on the traffic risk as is done with the Government Builds, Tolls 
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then Sells (GBTS) model two positive outcomes are achieved. Firstly the toll rate 
that is finally adopted is the market rate as dictated by the actual patronage and 
secondly it ensures the ongoing viability of the PPP model. The private sector was 
not going to keep funding toll roads after the disasters of the Cross City Tunnel, Lane 
Cover Tunnel, CLEM7 and Airport Link.  
The strength of private consortium that delivered the toll roads was another 
important factor which was supported by the case studies. All the case studies had 
strong private consortiums which was supported by the fact that all the case study 
consortiums delivered world class pieces of infrastructure well before their 
contractual completion dates. The main weakness of the consortiums was their 
ability to properly manage the development of traffic forecasts.  
Political Support was identified as a fundamental success factor, as without this 
projects will simply not progress past concept stage. All the case studies had a strong 
level of political support however the Cross City Tunnel only experienced this at the 
opening of the toll road. The Cross City Tunnel provides the perfect example of what 
can happen to a project if the public/community support is withdrawn and even 
becomes hostile. As detailed in the case study the public perception was that secret 
deals had been done between the government and the consortium to make changes to 
surface roads and funnel road patrons into the tunnel against their will. This resulted 
in a negative media campaign and road users actively boycotting the toll road. In 
contrast the Westlink M7 toll road completed market research to identify whether its 
tolling strategy was going to meet the expectations of society. Ultimately this 
strategy meant that the toll road users thought the distance based tolling rates were 
fair as they were only being charged for what they used. The Westlink M7 strategy 
also resulted in ‘Marketing’ being identified as an additional success factor. 
Transparency of Procurement as a success factor was also supported by the case 
studies as it effected the level of public/community support. Generally the Roads and 
Maritime Service projects had a high level of transparency which was supported by 
the existence of multiple government reports and audits. As previously discussed, 
there was a public perception of secret deals that resulted in the surface road changes 
for the Cross City Tunnel however parliamentary enquiries found this was 
unfounded. The Cross City Tunnel however demonstrated that the perception of 
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transparency of procurement as being an important success factor as without it public 
support can be lost resulting in political pressure. 
Positive environmental outcomes represents one of the leading objectives for the 
development of a road infrastructure. All the case study projects resulted in positive 
environmental impacts on the surrounding communities to the toll roads. This was 
particularly evident with the Eastern Distributor where a number of indirect public 
domain improvements were made. This included a substantial reduction in through 
traffic in the inner city suburbs of Surry Hills and Darlinghurst which resulted in 
improvement in environmental quality, amenity and the local economy. This has 
translated into significant redevelopment and upgrading of existing buildings, 
reinforcing an active area for community and business. Positive environmental 
outcomes such as the removal of traffic from local roads and moving large traffic 
volumes away from built up areas are key success factors for any toll road. This is 
one of the true benefits to society as a whole.   
As previously stated, one of the main drivers for toll roads is an increase to the 
economic performance of a city or region by reducing travel times, reducing vehicle 
operating costs, reducing accidents and vehicle emissions. All the case studies 
showed that some level of economic contribution was achieved with the Westlink 
M7 having a major impact on the economic prosperity of the areas located adjacent 
to the corridor. Once again this is a critical success factor as the economic 
contribution benefits the whole of society including the individual, business and the 
state.  
 
6.2 A future model for project delivery  
 
The main recommendations that can be made as a result of the findings of the case 
studies to achieve the successful delivery of projects in the future include;   
1. Governments should continue to adopt the PPP model and appoint the 
majority of the risk to the delivery consortiums, however to ensure the 
ongoing feasibility of the model governments must take a more active role in 
the management of traffic patronage risk. One such method is the adoption of 
the Government Builds, Tolls then Sells (GBTS). Ultimately governments 
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need the PPP model to remain healthy and attractive to the private sector as 
they no longer have the economic or managerial capacity to deliver such 
projects.  
2. Any PPP toll road delivery strategy must include a well-developed plan of 
how the public and community will be brought into the project. This includes 
engagement from the conceptual to operational stage. As demonstrated by the 
Cross City Tunnel Project, a community who feels they have been excluded 
from the development and delivery of a project can generate high political 
and economic consequences. A well planned marketing campaign as 
demonstrated by the Westlink M7 case study can be a key component to 
ensure the product being delivered meets community expectations which then 
results in public support.  
3. Any delivery of a PPP toll road must ensure transparency of the procurement 
process between the public and private sector. By doing so the risk of 
negative public community support is minimised which can reduce political 
risk   
4. The accuracy of traffic forecasts is critical to the economic prosperity of any 
PPP toll road and as such must be one of the main focuses of government and 
delivery consortiums. Where the accuracy of traffic forecasts is questionable 
steps must be taken to mitigate the risk such as the adoption of the GBTS 
model.  
5. Positive Environmental Outcomes including strong public domain 
improvements are one of the key indirect outcomes of road infrastructure and 
as such must be a key motivation for any PPP toll road.  
6. Economic contribution to the cities/regions in which the toll roads are 
constructed is the fundamental reason for their existence. It is therefore vital 
that any toll road delivery must be based on the positive cost benefit ratio.  
 
Ultimately the success factors identified can be adopted as a high order appraisal 
technique to govern whether a proposed project including its delivery method has the 
attributes to be considered a successful Public Private Partnership.  
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6.3 Government Builds, Tolls then Sells (GBTS) model. 
 
The evolution of the Government Builds, Tolls then Sells (GBTS) model can be 
directly related to the equilibrium framework proposed by Garvin (2007). 
Garvin proposed that the basic objective of a PPP programme was to nurture the 
development of the market and sustain its existence. He further proposed that to do 
this a PPP programme must establish equilibrium among four environments: (1) 
state, (2) society, (3) industry, and (4) the market.   
The financial failure of toll roads in the last ten years has meant there was no longer 
an equilibrium among the four environments, as the state was the main beneficiary. 
State and society was basically receiving below cost infrastructure while industry 
made significant losses and the market was becoming unfeasible. This meant the PPP 
programme was not nurturing the development of the market and its existence was 
becoming unsustainable.  
The government response to the imbalance was the development of the GBTS model. 
Under the GBTS model, the government bears the traffic risk during the ramp up 
period and the private sector bears the traffic risk after the ramp up-where traffic 
patronage risk is low. The change in the delivery model ensures the PPP programme 
remains sustainable and therefore ensures its existence.  
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Chapter 7 – Conclusion 
 
The success factors identified in the literature review and then tested against the case 
studies all played important functions in ensuring overall success of the projects. As 
such all factors need to be considered for a holistic approach which not only ensures 
the success of an individual project but the ongoing sustainability of the Public 
Private Partnership market along with addressing the needs of society as a whole.  
Eight factors were initially identified in including;  
1. Risk allocation and sharing. 
2. Strength of private consortium. 
3. Political Support. 
4. Public/Community Support.  
5. Transparency of Procurement.  
6. Economic Viability. 
7. Environmental outcomes.  
8. Economic contribution to the cities/regions in which they are constructed. 
The Westlink M7 case study found marketing was also a critical component of the 
project success. All factors from the framework were found to be significant, 
however economic viability and public/community support appeared to be the most 
critical as they ensured the ongoing nurturing of the market as well as enabled 
continuing of political support for the PPP delivery model. Therefore the eight 
factors identified plus the additional factor identified in the Westlink M7 case study 
contribute to the success of PPP toll roads in Australia. 
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